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REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Letter dated 3 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Interregional Conference and Workshop on Public Administration and Social Development held at Stockholm from 16 to 20 October 1995 (see annex).*

The Conference and Workshop was organized by the Department for Development Support and Management Services of the United Nations Secretariat, in cooperation with the Swedish International Services. It was supported by the Government of Sweden as a contribution to the activities relating to the work of the General Assembly at its resumed session on public administration and development.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 12.

(Signed) Peter OSVALD
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of Sweden to the United Nations

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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ANNEX

Report of the Interregional Conference and Workshop on Public Administration and Social Development held at Stockholm from 16 to 20 October 1995

INTRODUCTION

The Interregional Conference and Workshop on Public Administration and Social Development was held in Stockholm, Sweden, 16-20 October 1995. The Meeting was hosted by the United Nations and the Government of Sweden and co-organized by the Department for Development Support and Management Services of the United Nations (UN/DDSMS), and Swedish International Services (Swedserv AB) with support of several participating Swedish public sector organizations.

The two-day Conference on 16-17 October 1995 was open to the international community. The Conference was followed by a three-day Workshop for participants from developing countries and transitional economies to permit further sharing of ideas and country experiences.

THE STOCKHOLM MEETING AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE SOCIAL SUMMIT

Over one hundred participants from governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations around the world gathered in Stockholm to accept a charge and a challenge. The charge came in the form of the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action. In that document, 117 Heads of State and Government, assembled at the World Summit for Social Development, committed their respective nations to:

> a political, economic, ethical and spiritual vision for social development that is based on human dignity, human rights, equality, respect, peace, democracy, mutual responsibility and cooperation, and full respect for the various religious and ethical views and cultural backgrounds of people. Accordingly, we will give the highest priority in national, regional and international policies and actions to the promotion of social progress, justice and the betterment of the human condition, based on full participation by all.[1]

These Heads of State and Government added that the responsibility for the attainment of these lofty purposes rested in the first instance with individual states but recognized as well "that these goals cannot be achieved by States alone. The international community, the United Nations, the multilateral financial institutions, all regional organizations and local authorities, and all actors of civil society need to positively contribute their own share of efforts and resources in order to reduce inequalities among people and narrow the gap between developed and developing countries in a global effort to reduce social tensions, and to create greater social and economic stability and security."[2]

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In addition to this broad charge, there is an even more specific challenge given by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 49/136 of 19 December 1994. The resolution recognized the important role that Governments and public administration can play in addressing new responsibilities arising from the pursuit of sustained economic growth and sustainable development. Among the critical areas of development highlighted for review is the role of public administration in promoting social development, and combatting socio-economic disparities and poverty.

In that context, during 1995, it was agreed to undertake a number of activities designed to enhance capacities in individual States and international organizations to more effectively implement and operate key development policies and programmes around the world. To that end, the United Nations convened a Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance from 31 July to 11 August 1995. One of the principal objectives of that meeting was to submit recommendations to the General Assembly for consideration on the agenda of its Resumed Fiftieth Session on Public Administration and Development to take place from 15 to 19 April 1996 in New York.[3] That session will take as its principal subject capacity building in public administration, inter alia, for social and sustainable development.

The United Nations together with the Swedish Government invited to Stockholm a wide range of experts from around the world to take the next step in the critical discussion of how to address the often discussed implementation gap between policy design and actual outcomes. The task is to find ways to make social development a reality in the day-to-day lives of people around the world. The participants worked in plenary sessions and workshops to find common ground from which to launch a renewed effort to enhance public administration for social development.

The remainder of this report presents a summary of their activities as well as their findings and recommendations.

PRESENTATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS

During the first two days of Conference, speakers from a wide range of international organizations, institutes of public administration, government officials and representatives of the host country presented both candid assessments of a wide range of problems facing social development programme designers and administrators and examples of state of the art solutions and programme successes. While recognizing that the many serious public administration problems in social development do not have ready solutions, the speakers' comments, nevertheless, sought to evaluate those problems realistically. These presentations also

prepared the way for the Working Group sessions that followed in the remaining days of the meeting.

Mr. Guido Bertucci, Director, Division for Public Administration and Development Management, presented opening remarks on behalf of the United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services and challenged the participants to explore new possibilities for solving critical social development issues. Mr. Jan Nygren, Minister, Prime Minister's Office, Sweden set the tone for the discussions as he welcomed participants to a continuous dialogue to approach the future of public administration for social development. As Minister for Public Management in the Prime Minister's Office, Mr. Nygren explained the current major effort, through a Commission on Public Administration, to make the ambitious changes needed to prepare public administration to meet the challenges of the future. The meeting also received warm greetings from the Mayor of Stockholm, Mr. Mats Hulth and the Under-Secretary of State of Sweden, Mr. Mats Carlsson, who asserted that we need organization for civil society. He noted that sound policies were necessary but that our situation required effective public institutions to carry out those policies.

The speakers who addressed social policy issues made it clear that it was inappropriate to have social policies and finance placed in opposition to one another. Indeed, it was important to determine how we can connect and interact between social policies and economic policies. Emphasis was laid on thorough examination of mutual implications of economic and social policies at the policy formulation stage and developing appropriate mechanisms, processes and capacities to deal with those implications in the final adoption of policies and their implementation. More specifically, public management reform cannot be related solely or even primarily to cost-cutting, although it was clearly recognized that social development must be accomplished under ever more complex fiscal conditions.

A number of the experts who addressed the Conference also stressed the importance of local governments in the consideration of social programme delivery. In fact, the role of subnational institutions was deemed all the more critical in light of the continuing international trend towards decentralization, and because local government is the primary point of contact between governments and the citizens they serve. The problem is to keep attention firmly fixed on the people for whom social development policies were designed while maintaining a functioning and indeed vital network of communications and coordination with all other levels of government as well as with international institutions. It was noted that successful networking could take place within existing institutional and legal structures provided that there

existed a clear definition of long term goals and principles and quantified targets in the short term.

Enhanced organization was judged to be all the more essential in situations in which the management tasks are complex and the political, economic, and social contexts were most challenging. Thus it was important to examine critically the nature and process of decentralization as it is employed in policy implementation and programme administration. If organizations are to take public administration from the capital cities to the village streets and farmers' fields in the developing world, stakeholders must be involved, capacity building must be provided for, and there must be attention to what happens at the intermediate levels of government policy. Indeed, developed countries around the world must reexamine their service delivery systems as well, to ensure that they also meet these organizational challenges. These efforts at restructuring of policy and reorganization of delivery systems cannot achieve the results for which they were undertaken unless there is careful attention to the redesign and enhancement of civil service systems.

It was the relationship between the people and the techniques of public management to which Conference participants turned in the session on management issues. It seems clear that a positive role of government is emerging, based on active pursuit of the public interest and forward looking efforts to achieve the goals of the Copenhagen Summit. That will require attention to the mechanisms of capitalization of public enterprise and management strategies that are alert to problems of undercapitalization and designed to respond to them. It requires as well a recognition that governments will be engaged in the use of both direct service delivery operations and the use of market-based tools such as contracts, incentives, and fee based systems. The hiring, training, and supervision of the kinds of people who will be needed to administer these policy instruments demands attention to skills such as negotiation and contract management. There will increasingly be a mix of policy implements that can be employed to address a particular problem, and administrators must be prepared and skilled in a range of those instruments.

It was also clear from the discussion on management issues that there are many management techniques, from Management by Results to Total Quality Management to Total Commitment Management and from reengineering to delayering, that must be explored as possible routes to enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery. At the same time, even as public managers experiment with these techniques, they must carefully study them in order to better understand how they may affect ministries and their personnel over the long term.

It is equally clear that new policies, new organizational approaches, and new management techniques call for a reconsideration of the mechanisms of accountability used in public administration for social development. Thus, there is need for more attention to be paid to appropriate mechanisms for the introduction of greater transparency, and more effective control and accountability in the management of social development programmes, particularly in developing countries.

Several speakers offered lessons from a range of social development programmes around the world as to how financing has been provided and used in creative ways. Nevertheless, there were cautions about the possible externalities that can flow from such devices as user fees in health care delivery or education, where early experiments suggest possible barriers to service access in local communities. Achievement of meaningful social development calls for effective partnership between the government, civil society and community organisations, and thus need not be equated exclusively with public spending. This involves not only optimum use and efficient management of existing resources contributed by government, but also mobilization of domestic resources by the formal sector, citizens and community initiatives, as well as contributions by bilateral and multilateral organizations and innovative financing modalities.

A recurring theme in the discussions on finance and implementation was the importance of transparency and accountability. It was made clear that participation should begin even at the stage of policy design, well before implementation and future evaluation are considered. In fact, it is important to have the involvement of stakeholders, particularly the intended beneficiaries, as the policy design process moves to consideration of the appropriate techniques of implementation and evaluation. Those techniques of evaluation must not only be technically capable of ensuring that causal linkages are clearly understood, but they must also be culturally sensitive in order to make certain that the data and analysis resulting from evaluation make sense in the local context.

RESULTS OF THE WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS

While the Conference speakers contributed a great deal of knowledge and experience to the discussions, the government officials and nongovernmental experts similarly had a great deal of experience and lessons to share and many important questions to explore. Thus, during the subsequent three days, participants were assembled in five Working Groups. The Working Groups began their discussions by exchanging information, based on country

papers which they had prepared, with regard to commonalities and unique features of their administrative systems for social development. Then they proceeded to address a set of common questions at the core of public administration for social development. These questions relate to policy making and coordination, institutional structures, decentralization, management style, financing social development, accountability, the implementation challenge, and cooperation with international agencies. The following findings and recommendations resulted from the discussion of these questions.

Facing the Difficult Question - Policy Making and Coordination

> What organizational mechanisms should be introduced to support the policy making process, especially bearing in mind the need for integrated approaches to economic and social development?

The effective formulation of social policy demands commitment at the highest level of government. Each country should adopt a long term vision of its social problems and goals. Such a picture, however, would be incomplete if it failed to address economic conditions and other contextual factors that can affect social development efforts. The objective of this effort is to develop a more coherent pattern of social policies and to enhance coordination among those policies through advanced planning. Improved coordination is also necessary between social policies and other national policies, especially those in the economic arena. It is also critical that these forecasting and goal setting activities contemplate both national and local objectives and rural and urban needs in order to facilitate decentralized administration. Such coordination is essential to enhance efficiency in the delivery of social programmes and services. In fact, decentralization is a policy mechanism in itself, the benefits of which should be fully exploited. The attempt to provide for better long term forecasting also makes possible a combination of sectoral perspectives and a more integrative sense of policy design.

It is essential that top down approaches to policy development be avoided and that efforts are made to build consensus by involving all stakeholders in the process. That effort at inclusion must reach those in rural communities as well as those in the urban areas. The involvement of all of these participants requires time and effort at all stages of the policy making and coordination process, but it will enhance cooperation at the implementation stage. Of course, political leaders must maintain effective contact with relevant groups as a policy moves through the formulation, adoption and implementation stages of the process. Government likewise has an important role to monitor the entire process. Efforts to maintain appropriate

communication will render the task of coordination with stakeholders simpler and more successful.

Establishment of a coordinating body placed at the highest level should be considered. It is also useful to consider the creation of national think tanks consisting of academics, experts and stakeholders at all levels who can provide relevant data and information, speculate about the long term and bring to the process new and different perspectives.

The entire policy process will benefit from capacity building efforts which should be undertaken at all levels of government, but particularly at the local level which is the point of contact between citizens and social services. Training in evaluation and planning techniques will benefit not only officials but also the citizens they serve.

Policy is not made on a constant or stable foundation. Crises or the existence of periods of intensive transition from one stage of development to another will dramatically affect all phases of the policy process. Where an extended transition period can be anticipated, the process should be shaped accordingly. Specifically, more contingencies will be needed in the contemplation of a particular type of policy, where significant shifts in conditions are predictable.

Finally, it is particularly important that policy development be based upon behavioral experience in the cultural setting in which the effort is undertaken. Policies based upon sophisticated incentive systems may operate in one way in a developed western economy but may have very different effects if implemented in a significantly different cultural setting without a realistic sense of the impact on local norms. It is thus particularly important to make use of impact analyses of policy efforts to inform future policy development.

Institutional Structures

> How should the institutional structures of the social sector through which public administrators work to implement policy be redesigned to meet the needs of the people they are intended to serve, recognizing the obligation to reach the sectors of extreme poverty?

Capacity building at all levels is a prerequisite for any institutional structure to function including the capacity to understand global issues and concerns and to formulate trade off and impact analysis. Raising the consciousness and participation of citizens has worked as an effective mechanism to provide a base support to the formal institutions.

The capabilities of central and local governments to coordinate and implement policies should be enhanced, to ensure sustainability and flexibility with provisions for a system of client feedback. Institutions should be able to provide service of the quality that citizens deserve and at a price affordable to taxpayers. As such these institutions should provide to the clients programmes of choice through competition. NGOs and other members of civil society could be mobilized as service providers or monitors of service implementation.

Institutions must ensure capacity to address the needs of those in extreme poverty, assess targets, and address causes as well as effects. They must be structured in such a way that they focus on the job to be done and have all the systems and techniques that enhance effective service delivery with provisions for participation, consultation and networking among the affected sectors with a streamlined centre of operation.

Decentralization and the Coordination Question

> In light of your understanding of the overall institutional design and the role played by decentralization in it, how can we obtain the benefits of decentralization and the creativity of local governments in the social field while avoiding what has been called the coordination crisis, realizing that the coordination crisis involves the need to relate local government to national organizations as well as relationships among national institutions?

Conference participants felt that decentralization was one of the most important forces in modern public administration, and particularly with respect to administration for social development. It has impact not only on individual implementation efforts, but also on the policy process as a whole. When done properly and carefully, decentralization efforts serve to empower and motivate people in government at all levels and in the community.

To be done properly, decentralization must take into account the particular context, which includes administrative dimensions and territorial or geographic factors. An awareness of cultural factors is absolutely essential. The essence of real decentralization is that at the same time it must be participative in character and facilitate involvement over the long term by all stakeholders.

There was consensus among Conference participants that effective and efficient central government is an essential precondition for successful decentralization. Effective devices for coordination must also be constructed at the intermediate levels. Indeed, it is necessary to have a clear coordinating

structure in place before decentralization efforts are launched. Once initiated, the decentralization effort must be carefully defined and controlled. This means, among other things, that it must carry to the local level both responsibility for decision and action and also the resources necessary to support those efforts.

Assessment of administrative functions prior to decentralization is needed in order to identify those that work effectively in a centralized mode, and those that would be more effective if decentralized. For example, policy formulation, coordination, and co-financing work more effectively if centralized, while budgeting, personnel decisions, operations, and delivery of service tend to work more effectively when decentralized.

Capacity building is required in order for this process to work well. This is needed by all participants in the process, but the local level is the most important locus of activity and therefore requires the most intensive efforts to build the institutions and processes required and has the greatest need for training. That effort should yield innovation, adaptability, and development of new strategies and programmes.

Real decentralization must go hand in hand with carefully designed mechanisms of accountability for administrators at all levels. It is not enough for those in the community to have had an opportunity to voice concerns. They must have a sense that their actions are more than mere opportunities to vent frustration.

It should be obvious from these requirements that decentralization is an expensive process in the short term but it should be viewed as a long term investment. In weighing those costs, the costs of not acting should also be considered.

The Matter of Management Style

> Which managerial styles, both internal and with respect to direct client services, are most appropriate for social development programmes (e.g. poverty, health care, education, social security)?

It is clear that administration for social development must be flexible and adaptable. Management procedures should be simplified and be made adaptable to the changing demands and conditions of local managers, and respond to a code of conduct. They must be performance oriented and responsive to feedback from clients and other stakeholders in social development.

Public sector employees recruitment, promotion, training and retraining systems, as well as their performance incentives, must be

designed in country and condition specific ways. The development and support of local management is essential.

Internally, management must be participative and flexible, a process in which all members of the organization provide inputs. Multi-disciplinary team building is essential if that participative process is to flourish and enhance implementation of all programmes.

Temporary rotation of the staff to share experiences could be implemented in some cases. That effort could be particularly useful, for example, in interchanging personnel in economic and social fields, in order to encourage integrated economic and social approaches.

If the management process is to be results driven, it is important to identify objectives and performance indicators. Consideration should be given to the introduction of management by objectives. Measures of performance should not be based upon production or quantity alone, but should also consider effectiveness and an awareness of value for money. When introducing performance evaluation, it is important to examine the impact of programmes on different target groups, e.g. women, who are often a major target of social development programmes.

Since decentralization is a long term goal, it must be target-specific. For that purpose interactive, systematic participation of the target groups in the management structure is critical. Consequently, proper administrative mechanisms for decentralization, including adequate information systems and technical skills and competence, should be developed.

The customer should be the focus of social programmes and there must be feedback and participatory mechanisms at customer's level. Of course, participative and feedback devices must always be culturally sensitive.

There is also a requirement for dialogue among different stakeholders, including the field personnel who actually deliver the services and for incorporating the participation of civil society (NGOs, trade unions, etc.) in the management of social programmes.

Across-the-board management training and orientation, including a commitment to learn, should be incorporated. In addition, specific training programmes for women and families can be designed to help implement the overall strategy.

Contemporary management skills require enhanced information and methodologies for managing and evaluating information. Information on the services available should be disseminated widely. For example, a directory of services can be prepared to

inform people of when, where and how they can obtain services and also of their rights. Effective media communications should also be encouraged in the dissemination process.

Financing Social Development

> How can public managers effectively reconceptualize the financial operations of social agencies, both in terms of the complexity of the revenue picture and more creative expenditure mechanisms?

The problems of finance mirror the complexity of all other elements of public administration for social development. They concern not only issues such as the amount and forms of financial resources that should be available within developing nations, but they also involve more sophisticated questions of redeployment of various kinds of financing resources.

The participants recommended that countries should allocate at least 5 per cent of their GDP to social programmes, and allocate resources to capacity building for social programmes.

Cost effectiveness should underlie policy for all social development programmes. Prestige projects should be avoided at all costs. Both needs and expenditures should be prioritized.

Dependency on external assistance should be avoided. The economy should generate the necessary resources to be applied to social development, thereby avoiding borrowing, which creates dependency. The key objective to be attained, as in all other areas, is sustainability.

Financial resources should be allocated to productive activities to raise funds for social projects such as investment in agriculture, industry, micro enterprises, etc. Proceeds from privatization of public enterprises should be channelled to social development projects.

User fees should be considered for services rendered, but attention should be given to the need to exempt from payment those who are most in need of social services yet unable to pay for them. Indeed, special incentives should be provided for those most in need of assistance to take advantage of available assistance programmes. Consideration should also be given to the use of non financial payments for social services.

Cost reduction must be achieved wherever possible, particularly where there are possible redundancies in organizations or services which should be streamlined. Governments and their taxpayers cannot be expected to provide more assistance if they are not convinced that existing resources

are being used as efficiently and effectively as possible. There must be a strict and efficient financial management system to ensure proper usage of funds. Capacity building efforts should be specifically targeted to financial administration.

Sources of funding should include fairly assessed and effectively collected taxes at both the national and sub-national levels. Loans are appropriate sources of funding but they should be considered short term funding only, except for capital expenditures on buildings or equipment. If loans are undertaken, it should be very clear how those loans will be repaid in a reasonable period. More attention should be paid to development of innovative sources of financing.

Tax incentives should be encouraged as a form of generating revenue, although they must be used carefully to avoid unfortunate competition among jurisdictions to attract businesses, leaving some taxpayers carrying a disproportionately heavy burden of taxation. Another form of investment is to enhance programme and service support in rural areas, with the aim of reducing internal migration to cities and receiving reasonable returns from agricultural production that could be reinvested in social development programmes.

Reducing excessive expenditure on military armaments should be encouraged. Even a modest percentage shift in military expenditures towards social development could produce substantial revenues which can be utilized to increase the impact of social programmes. Other forms of underused or unused capacity should be recommitted to more productive investments. In particular, investments are needed in research. They will be required for the foreseeable future in local government as well. These are long term investments that will pay various types of dividends. In evaluating both revenue generating activities and expenditures, a strong emphasis should be placed on those efforts that are likely to enhance social equity.

The Accountability Question: The Heart of It All

> How can mechanisms of transparency, control, and accountability be introduced into the management of social programmes?

Based on a review of country papers and from the deliberations of the Working Group sessions, it was clear that there was an urgent need for mechanisms to ensure transparency, accountability, and control. It is important to introduce those mechanisms into the management of social development programmes at all levels. A number of specific areas of emphasis were identified.

At the core of the discussion of accountability were repeated calls for participation at every stage of social policy development and administration, and at all levels of government. The willingness to participate which comes with a sense of efficacy and confidence in the process is particularly essential in a system in which management of results measured by well defined performance standards is to be a key to social development administration.

Implicit in the participation emphasis is a call for continuous feedback and various types of control. Beyond general mechanisms of accountability, however, the participants also called for increased use of audits, both financial and performance, with specific requirements for timely responses to audit identified deficiencies. Support for capacity development in this area is important, but participants recommended that, in the absence of expanded ability to ensure timely and regular audits within government, other independent auditors should be brought in to maintain oversight. Where necessary, there should be no hesitation to impose sanctions.

At times, there has been a lack of attention to parliamentary roles in oversight. Participants urged not only that such oversight activities be enhanced but that the results of parliamentary inquiries and other oversight activities should be used in future decision making concerning ministries and programme.

Meeting the Implementation Challenge

> Given your answers to the preceding questions, what lessons have we learned and what guidance is given to the process of implementation of reform of social programmes based upon the administrative reform efforts of the past decade around the world?

The role of public administrators is essential to bridge the gap between the policy formulation and the implementation process. Excessive attention is given to formulation, and limited attention to the implementation phase. Clarity of guidelines and operational procedures should be the focus of the implementation process.

The country reports presented by participants in the meeting provided a wide range of guidelines for effective implementation of social development based on the precept of strengthening the public administration system. The view was that lessons could be learned on what to avoid and what to emphasize in a desired social programme. For example, exemplary rural health programmes from a developing country could be used as a model in another country, with special consideration of the necessary components for effective implementation.

Participation of relevant players in the implementation process, (such as regional and local level administrators, members of the targeted community, non-governmental organizations and civil society), and in the planning and design of specific activities, was not only desirable but necessary. The level or intensity of the participation of various players can vary from country to country depending upon the strength of the public administration system. In the case of countries where the public administration is barely at its inception because the society has been ravaged by civil strife and genocide, increased participation is unlikely in the short term. In other countries, however, attention should be paid to changing ingrained traditional, submissive and subordinate patterns based on marked socio-economic disparities. Promoting responsibility and assertion of rights among community members becomes a prerequisite to active participation in the implementation process of social development programmes.

Development of a sense of ownership among public administrators is also critical to effective implementation. However, a top-down approach was pervasive with directives mandated by high-level officials or external donor agencies, even in contradiction to sound administrative practices. Among the ways to enhance a sense of ownership is to facilitate the participation of public administrators at various levels and to strengthen the role of local government institutions. Another alternative to enhance a sense of ownership is to recruit from local expertise instead of bringing in external experts. This is particularly important when regional and local cultural difference has a bearing on implementation.

Capacity building and resource allocation, both human and financial, were considered essential to assure successful implementation. Various countries experience difficulties in the implementation stage because of inadequate training. In other cases, the mandates are there but the resources are not available to carry them out.

Another barrier to effective implementation was rigid procedures that impede making necessary changes. The need for flexible, adaptive and transparent procedures to facilitate implementation was highly emphasized (instead of the application of standardized or rigid formats and practices, at times externally imposed) in order to suit the needs of the targeted groups.

Flexible operational mechanisms become necessary to accommodate unforeseen or unintended results in the implementation process. Such flexibility would allow the required adjustment of the operational mode.

Contracting out of services was viewed as an alternative under certain conditions. First, contracting out should be done when the quality of service delivery was high, and second, it should be carried out only with qualified non-governmental organizations or private agencies. Again, this was considered an option only in cases where the public sector lacked the required capability.

Implementation was considered to have been generally reactive rather than proactive. Thus, emphasis was placed on change, based on a long-term and forward looking approach instead of remedial or backward looking reform.

Joining Hands with International Institutions

> What recommendations do you have as to the most effective means of cooperation between the United Nations and other international agencies and national efforts in improving the effectiveness of public administration at promoting social development?

International agencies should foster democratic processes in Member States and social dialogue, with a view to achieving social justice and peace.

There are a number of issues that must be addressed to make it possible for international organizations to have more effective and harmonious relationships with recipient countries. They begin with the determination of the need for assistance through the process of application and award of assistance, and include the ways in which evaluation is accomplished.

Financing of projects should be needs driven. Too often, donors lack knowledge, within an appropriate context, of local needs. Donors should be available to help. However, the process should be demand driven and not unduly influenced by the institutional requirements or priorities of the donors. Projects should be seen as belonging to the countries and not to the donors. Countries and donors should operate in a spirit of partnership.

As donors assess where and how to invest, it is important to measure the wealth of would-be recipients in social and natural resources terms rather than simply in monetary terms. One aspect of that assessment should be an understanding of just how far from the take off point for development a given country is at the point of application for assistance.

Changes in donor processes and criteria are important as well as urgent. It is critically important to simplify and standardize procedures to avoid unnecessary burdens on applicants. Indeed, it is important to redesign the forms of

international financial assistance and to use as much creativity as possible in the effort. Debt swaps and similar mechanisms for social development projects should be explored.

Other changes that would arise after assistance is awarded include greater freedom for recipients to use regional and local resources. In addition to the fact that the use of such local experts is far more cost effective, it also helps to ensure that the assistance received is conditioned by a sensitivity to local needs and relevant cultural factors.

Despite the need for respect and discretion in dealing with the recipient government, it is important for donors to monitor the use of funds to prevent abuses in the interest of ensuring that the best use is being made of scarce international support funds. When there are multiple programmes in an area, it is important to coordinate overlapping projects and avoid conflicts in what might become competing projects in the same policy field.

This balance between the need to grant proper respect to recipients and yet maintain accountability in the use of funds will be assisted by an effort on the part of international agencies to stimulate dialogue with developing countries, and to include within that dialogue national professional organizations.

Another force that will contribute to the wise use of resources is for international agencies to provide information and training on best practices to ensure that the state of the art is getting to everyone in the field as quickly as possible. However, there is always the need for care in applying lessons from one context to another. Projects and sometimes even the information acquired from them are not necessarily transferable from one country to another.

Unlike an earlier day when there was an often repeated dichotomy between international actions affecting developing nations and those involving developed states, there is no longer such a simplistic distinction. Many problems of social development are truly global issues, common to all types of countries. For example, some aspects of social development, previously related mainly to developing countries in health, education, human settlements, and resettlement of displaced persons, etc. are now global in extent applicable to large segments, for example, the inner cities of developed countries. These include such concerns as homelessness, teenage pregnancy, spread of communicable diseases, etc. Other types of social development ills are also global in their effect, such as AIDS and environmental problems. Developed nations need the cooperation and assistance of other nations as do developing states.

The key to any work on international cooperation is to aim for mechanisms that lead to sustainability in service programmes and their delivery systems. As such, there is a need to monitor the programmes of action mandated by the Rio, Geneva, Cairo, Copenhagen and Beijing World Conferences.

The monitoring role should be in the nature of a facilitating process for the exchange of experiences, capacity building, etc. Innovative and creative approaches to donor financing are required including changes in conditionalities, systems for greater use of national or regional expertise, procurement, etc. Many social development issues as described above are becoming global issues which could lead to the allocation of resources for global issues instead of specific social development related problems of developing countries.

The establishment of a debt swap or other relief system for social development may be considered along similar lines as for environmental protection and other developmental activities. Attention should be given to the imposition of international agencies criteria and parameters on recipient countries where these are in conflict with national traditional systems or culture. It was stated that grants instead of loans should be made available for social development projects. Major emphasis in all externally funded activities should be given to sustainability at all levels incorporating capacity building, and the exercise of initiative at the local level in a long-term perspective. Social science research and prevailing cultural orientation may be considered as a prerequisite to many funding and technical cooperation activities.

Financing must be viewed as a set of long term concerns, including decisions about return on investment. The evaluation of returns on investment must take into consideration social, as well as economic, dividends. This is an area in which more research is needed.

CONCLUSION

The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development has stated:

"We acknowledge that the people of the world have shown in different ways an urgent need to address profound social problems, especially poverty, unemployment and social exclusion, that affect every country. It is our task to address both their underlying and structural causes and their distressing consequences in order to reduce uncertainty and insecurity in the life of people.[4]"

The Stockholm Conference and Workshop analyzed the role that public administration should play faced with this serious concern of our time. There was an effort to move beyond reform to a new

vision, appropriate as we approach the turn of a new century. There is no more critical force than the suffering of millions for want of food, shelter, health care, and the other basic necessities of life. Moreover, the task was not merely to seek immediate solutions but also to find ways to address problems that are likely to be with us for the foreseeable future.

Among the fundamental themes which the Meeting examined were the need for public administration to support and dynamize social policies, reduce inequalities, sustain investment in basic social fields such as education, health, etc., and ensure efficient management of social policies and programmes.

Decentralization and participation were perceived by the Meeting as two important forces shaping modern public administration. The transference of social services to local governments and their strengthening can bring significant improvements. It is necessary, however, to combine this process with the active incorporation of target communities in the design of the social policies, as well as in their implementation, monitoring and evaluation. At the same time, the Meeting noted, efficient central government is a precondition for successful decentralization.

The management of social programmes increasingly should emphasize flexibility, transparency and accountability; draw upon new ways to combine the efforts of government and civil society; incorporate participatory mechanisms that are culturally sensitive; and utilize enhanced methodologies for managing and evaluating information.

International organizations should orient themselves to support the development of social programmes which lead to self sustainability within the target communities; continue to stimulate dialogue and exchange of experiences; and provide information and training on best practices in the field of social development.

Thus, discussions at the Meeting were centred around how governments working with civil society and supported by the international community can achieve sustainable social development within the present economic, social, cultural and political context.

At the core of the challenge is the need to get beyond arguments over the proper role of public administration. In one sense, that is a question that is decided on an ongoing basis by the political regimes of respective governments. Nonetheless, as these discussions have indicated, there is a driving force that seeks to address the public interest while respecting the values of democratic governance and those essential human rights reiterated in the Copenhagen Social Summit documents.

Public administration will not disappear. It will acquire new techniques and face challenges to old ones. The attitudes and best practice of its practitioners will evolve as they have evolved over the past two decades, moving in the direction of greater service. The effort is to drive the focus of social development administration downward to the local community and outward to the rural areas as well as to serve the poorest citizens in both rural and urban communities.

These will not be easy undertakings, but instead they are rigorous, financially disciplined exercises. This report details concerns about sensitivity to efficiency, effectiveness, economy, representativeness, inclusion, participation and the task of ensuring value added for citizens of the respective countries. The efforts to address the central values of social development articulated in the Copenhagen documents is as difficult as it is essential.

The Conference and Workshop represented a process of engagement, of a collegial confrontation with the most difficult challenges. Its participants expressed frustration as well as optimism, and challenged the international institutions to take new and bold initiatives, such as the call for a complete revision of the international process for providing development assistance. There was a demand to address problems in the streets and rural areas and a call for more support to the development of local and regional expertise. There was likewise a demand for a continuous dialogue between administrators and those in whose name they govern. Finally, there was a call to others to join in the challenge.

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1. Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, p. 9.

2. Ibid., p. 11

3. Report of the Twelfth Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance, September 26, 1995

4. Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, p.3.

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REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Letter dated 4 April 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Regional Meeting on Public Administration and Development in Africa: from Structural Adjustment to Improved Efficiency in Government (see annex).*

The Division of Public Administration and Development Management of the Department for Development Support and Management Services of the United Nations Secretariat convened the seminar, co-organized with Namibia, through the Office of the Prime Minister, and it was held at Windhoek from 25 to 27 March 1996 in cooperation with the Economic Commission for Africa, the Special Unit for Technical Cooperation between Developing Countries of the United Nations Development Programme, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the French Ministry of Cooperation.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 12.

(Signed) Tunguru HUARAKA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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ANNEX

Report of the Regional Meeting on Public Administration and Development in Africa: from Structural Adjustment to Improved Efficiency in Government

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By Resolution 49/136 of 19 December 1994 the General Assembly of the United Nations decided to resume its fiftieth session in March-April 1996 in order to examine the question of Public Administration and Development, "exchange important experiences, review the activities of the United Nations in this field, and make recommendations as appropriate". Operative paragraph 8 of the Resolution invited the "Regional Commissions to consider in 1995 the role of Public Administration in Development and to report, through the Economic & Social Council to the General Assembly at its resumed session". DDSMS, which is responsible for the preparation of the 50th Resumed Session on Public Administration and Development, established, a Technical Committee in which it associated ECA. The Technical Committee is composed in addition to DDSMS and ECA, the World Bank, UNDP, ILO, IIAS and Harvard University. ECA also participated in the inter-agency meeting which was convened in New York on 28 July 1995 and in the Twelfth Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Program on Public Administration and Finance, which was held in New York from 29 July to 11 August 1995. During these meetings, consultations were held between DDSMS and ECA on the organization of a possible joint seminar in Africa on the subject of Structural Adjustment and Improved Efficiency in Government. In the course of its organization consultations were also held between DDSMS and SU/TCDC of UNDP. In addition to ECA and UNDP/SU/TCDC, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the French Ministry of Cooperation decided to co-sponsor and participate in the Seminar. The Government of Namibia offered to host the event.

The following countries participated: Angola, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verdi, Cote D'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Sao Tome et Principe, Senegal and Uganda. Also present were participants from the following entities: the United Nations: Department of Development Support and Management Services, Department of Public Information, UNDP- Windhoek, the UNDP Special Unit for TCDC and the Economic Commission for Africa; the Commonwealth Secretariat; the French Ministry of Cooperation; the African Training and Research Center on Administration for Development (CAFRAD); and the Observatoire des Fonction Publique Africaines (OFPA).

1.1 Background

Preamble paragraph 6 of Resolution 49/136 considered that "some initiatives to reform public administration taken by some countries in the context of structural adjustment programmes have not always been based on a policy conceived and defined for the long term". Structural adjustment is part of a process of global restructuring which may be defined simply as increased reliance on market forces and wrongly as a reduced role of the state in economic management.

The debt and economic crises which intensified in a number of countries from the mid 70s resulted in macro-economic imbalances which were viewed by the IMF and the World Bank as unsustainable and led them to offer structural adjustment programmes. Between 1979 and 1988 most African countries undertook structural Adjustment Programmes. These structural Adjustment Programmes have 2 stages: Stabilization aimed at cost containment and thus at deficit reduction and structural adjustment which reforms economic policies and institutions in order to make more efficient use of resources and counteract the loss of growth caused by stabilization. Most structural Adjustment Programmes have directly or indirectly led to public service restructuring, because the size and wage bill have normally been targets for reduction. The structural Adjustment basic-cost containment measures had mixed results. In few countries numbers declined dramatically, but in others it took longer than expected to achieve reductions or early reductions were offset by subsequent expansion. By the early 1990s however "downsizing" was becoming more widespread and more substantial. On the qualitative side both fiscal and efficiency impacts were less than had been expected and overall, despite some success, movement on institutional reforms has been halting for several reasons namely weaker management capacity than expected, rapid turnover of management and political leaders, poorly executed development programmes and failure to install systems to monitor, supervise and evaluate reform programmes.

For these reasons governments and donor partners are now looking beyond structural adjustment to improved governance. Within this context, ECA organized in 1993 a major Regional Conference on Development Management in Africa and recommended a Strategic Agenda for Development Management in Africa in the 1990s. Along these lines, the World Bank articulated a governance approach to Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa and convened a meeting on the subject in the Gambia in 1994 and DDSMS supported CAFRAD in the organization in 1994 of a Pan-African Conference of Ministers of Civil Service which adopted the "Tangier Declaration" that resulted in a decision of the UN General Assembly to resume its 50th Session in April 1996 and discuss the question of "Public Administration and Development".

1.2 The Meeting

The seminar was officially opened by the Honourable Deputy Prime Minister, Rev. Hendrik Witbooi, with opening remarks from representatives of the sponsoring organizations.

The seminar participants heard and discussed the following presentations:

(1) The African Public Administration and Development: From Firefighting to prevention

(2) Promotion and Management of Productivity of Public Institutions in Africa

(3) Accountability in Public Service

(4) Responsiveness in the Public Service

(5) African Public Services in the Twenty-first Century: Creating and enabling environment.

(6) Use of TCDC modality in enhancing improvement of efficiency in government.

2.0 ISSUES ADDRESSED

One obvious lesson learnt from the recent assessment of administrative reform efforts in Africa is that while a careful analysis of the size and cost of the public sector may indicate areas where resource use could be streamlined, it is necessary to go beyond the narrow monetary consideration to a comprehensive review of the productive capacity of the sector. There is an emerging consensus that public sector management reform should enhance productivity, accountability and responsiveness in public sector institutions. In the Seminar, participants discussed the following issues:

2.1 Major Constraints to Civil Service Reform

There are many constraints and impediments to effective and sustainable implementation of civil service reform in particular, and public sector reform in general. Most of these are related not only to a general lack of commitment and support from key stakeholders, but, perhaps more important, from a generalized lack of capacity - technical, operational, managerial, administrative, institutional -- to conceptualize, analyze, formulate, implement, monitor, evaluate, and learn from the lessons of experience resulting from the individual and collective program expenses.

In a recent review of lessons learned from one of the participating countries the following key impediments were identified:

1. Dysfunctional Civil Service organization
2. Inadequate personnel management and training
3. Insufficient management and supervisory skill
4. Inadequate facilities, assets, and maintenance culture
5. Inadequate pay and benefits
6. Lack of transparency and accountability
7. Pervasive corruption
8. Politicization of the civil service (e.g. staffing, decision-making) and threats to employment stability and security).

2.2 Productivity of Public Institutions

The impetus for reform stemmed from the realization that in many African countries, the Civil Service had become a brake rather than a catalyst to development. Reference was usually

made to its bloated size, inefficiency and poor performance. However, the elaboration of a coherent policy of civil service reform in Africa involves going well beyond structural adjustment programmes to addressing the question of how to build a highly efficient civil service to meet the challenge of political and economic development in a globalized world economy. Therefore, the major challenge of public sector management in contemporary Africa will be to enhance the sector's goal attainment and resource optimization capacity.

Productivity is often hindered by the following seven factors:

1. Underfunding a ministry or a public enterprise.

2. Undermanning and overstaffing departments.

3. Misallocation of human and financial resources.
4. Absence of financial discipline.

5. Absence of regular monitoring of performance.

6. Poor leadership, management and supervision.

7. Low employee morale and poor attitudes towards work.

2.3 Accountability in Public Service

Accountability is central to efficiency in government. Accountability means holding public officials responsible for their actions. Legislatures in Africa are generally weak and the traditional role of legislatures in the budgeting process is not widely practiced in Africa. African legislatures all too often lack much of the critical information essential to the exercise of legislative oversight. While there has been increased respect for the rule of law in many countries in recent years, there is still urgent need to strengthen the legal institutions throughout the continent. There are several countries now with Ombudsman offices but these need to be strengthened.

There was general consensus among participants of the existence of serious problems of corruption both within the political and civil leadership as well as in the rank and file. This is detrimental to economic development, good government, and civil service efficiency as well as political and civil stability.

2.4 Responsiveness of the Public Service

The desired outcome of public service action is expressed in terms of meeting the public's needs and its satisfaction. This action is facilitated if the provision of services is as close to the public as possible and therefore, if the delivery of services is decentralized. Decentralization can take many forms but it is often constrained by lack of adequate human and financial resources. The participation of the public through NGOs and community-based organizations can help in making the public service more responsive.

2.5 African Public Service in the Twenty-first Century

African public administration has suffered from the persistent effects of the continent's development crisis, creating an environment characterized by over-centralization, ethnic and religious conflicts. In order to meet the challenges of the Twenty-first century, it will be necessary to create conditions for the development of a sustainable enabling environment which includes elements of good governance: the restoration and consolidation of peace, rule of law, a functioning multi-party system, free and fair elections, a responsive, responsible, and decentralized administration, a dynamic private sector and free mass media. External assistance from bilateral and multilateral partners will continue to be needed for these and related priority areas.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Following lengthy, and at times controversial discussions, participants reached the following conclusions on the issues discussed:

3.1 Constraints to Civil Service Reform

Participants recognized the inter-relatedness among social and economic development, good governance, citizen participation, and public sector reform, including civil service productivity, accountability and responsiveness. In opening the Seminar, the Deputy Prime Minister, Honourable Rev. Hendrik Witbooi, put it in proper context when he said:

> "Our respective governments on the continent have been haunted by ... lack of capacity to formulate and implement appropriate policies and programmes; improper allocation and utilization of resources; wastage of scarce natural and human resources and the inevitable decrease in morale and motivation which are all significant contributions to the poor performance of our national economies. This situation is exarcebated when structural adjustment programmes are prescribed ... as a cure to such weaknesses. The question that faces all of us at this regional meeting is what is to be done in the face of such challenges."

Furthermore, the following lessons of experiences from various countries' civil service reforms were discussed:

Summary CSR Lessons of Experience

1. High level political commitment needs to support the reform process.

2. Need to broaden the process and involve the participation of clients and stakeholders outside the public sector. Local commitment and ownership is key to success.

3. Reforms take time.

4. Must take a broader strategic and integrated approach that includes governance and improved service delivery.

5. Technical capacity development, and institutional development must be enhanced.

6. It is important to take an experimental learning approach, record, document and share experiences~ results, lessons, etc. so as to enhance public sector institutional learning.

7. Need for systematic inter-country sharing of CSR experiences.

8. It is important to spell out in detail the specific tactical interventions by which the overall CSR strategic goals will be achieved.

3.2 Accountability in Public Service

Participants concluded that while some bold mechanisms have been put in place to enforce accountability there is still a need to strengthen most of them especially electoral systems, anti-corruption measures, citizen participation, codes of ethics, citizen charters or consumer councils, education, and skills training.

Realizing the limitations of the inherited public administrative system to address the emerging dynamic needs and expectations of the majority of the people, it would be necessary to strengthen the following:

(a) Research and Monitoring Units
(b) Public Accounts Committees
(c) Administrative Courts
(d) Anti-corruption bodies.

Given a conducive environment with political commitment, appropriate legal framework with clearly established guarantees and responsibilities for civil servants, as well as adequate resources, the public administration system should adopt and maintain the culture, norms and values of professionalism characterized by:

1. Neutrality and impartiality
2. Performance, efficiency and productivity
3. Continuous education, training and upgrading of skills

3.3 Responsiveness of the Public Service

A public agency's responsiveness to the public can be rated in terms of the response to user complaints: changes in volume of complaints, time taken to deal with complaints, and public satisfaction with the response or solution.

It was noted that the following factors would facilitate public sector responsiveness:

1. The capacity and willingness to provide prompt, courteous and timely services.

2. The willingness to provide information on policies, programmes, procedures, etc. in clear and simple languages.

3. The willingness to receive and solicit feedback from the citizens.

3.4 Preparing for the 21st Century

It was also concluded that sustainable improvements in African public administration for the Twenty-first Century require the creation of an enabling environment. The enabling environment would include functioning systems relating to the rule of law and constitutionalism, separation of powers, independent judiciary, democratization, decentralization, free media, and citizen education and active participation.

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

1. African public administration should focus on both economic and social development. Specifically, it was recommended that future initiatives should be locally owned and contextualized and draw on local knowledge and institutions.

2. It should also broadly focus on long-term governance issues rather than only the shortrun narrow aspects of cost and size; emphasize the development of human capital, including staff training and citizen awareness and education; democratization and protection of civil liberties. Participation efforts, aimed at improving public administration systems, should involve trade unions, chambers of commerce, NGOs and other civil society associations in both policy formulation and execution.

3. Recruitment to positions in public administration should, in as much as possible, be based on merit, but where political, social and cultural realities dictate accommodating disadvantaged groups, governments are encouraged to take appropriate measures to rectify any inequities.

4.2 PRODUCTiVITY

1. Government organizations should be required to develop objectives, targets and performance indicators for monitoring the achievement of productivity goals. To the extent possible, employees should be involved in the determination of objectives and in setting performance targets.

2. To enhance productivity in the civil service, officials should be provided with adequate PaY and appropriate infrastructural facilities, information technology, equipment and supplies.

3. Management development institutes should be strengthened as instruments for promoting productivity through the expansion and diversification of competency training and retraining

programmes. They would also benefit from sub-regional and regional networking and selective twining arrangements with appropriate institutions.

4.3 ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS

1. Civic education should be conducted to create citizen awareness of political rights and duties as well as the political potency of the election box. Training programmes for public officials should highlight accountability issues as much as possible.

2. Methods of enforcing accountability such as parliamentary control, legislative accountability, ombudsman, etc. should be strengthened and external assistance should be mobilized, where appropriate.

3. To enhance accountable behavior on the part of public servants, greater attention should be paid to inculcating professional ethics and standards, including those adopted by professional associations (doctors, lawyers, accountants,).

4. (i) Countries should adopt stringent anti-corruption measures including the adoption of a code of ethics, the obligation on public officials to declare assets and the provision of adequate resources to ensure effective enforcement as a way of curbing harmful effects of corrupt practices on development.

(ii) Participants also called on northern countries to join hands with African and Southern Countries in combating corrupt practices associated with international trade (socalled "trade bribes").

5. Government should provide protection for whistleblowers who expose corrupt behaviors both in the public and private sectors.

6. Decentralization requires a strong state that provides a deconcentrated context for meaningful devolution. If there is no strong deconcentrated state, devolution could lead to the collapse of the state. To effectively decentralize, African governments are encouraged to devolve power to local levels as a way of deconcentrating the center and enhancing participation and accountability. Decentralization efforts, however, should be accompanied by adequate provision of financial and human resources.

4.4 PREPARING FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

1. In view of the persistent weaknesses of African public services, it is recommended that national governments, with donor assistance, should mobilize resources for retaining, attracting and effective utilizing qualified human resource, reversing the brain-drain and developing positive enabling environment which prepares African public administration for the local, regional and global challenges of the Twenty-first Century.

2. In order to ensure that African civil services are able to cope with the challenges of the next century, it is recommended that they adjust to the challenges and opportunities of the evolving information technology revolution: acquire the necessary knowledge, skills, tools, software and equipment. It is particularly recommended that adequate arrangements for inhouse maintenance be made with a view to developing a culture of maintenance. It is important that attention be paid to the type, quality and quantity of data, information, and knowledge which will impact on decision-making at all levels of public administration.

3. It is recommended that the redefinition of the role of the state for the 21st Century should emphasize its responsibility for guaranteeing the freedom and fundamental rights of citizens in the political sphere while assuming the role of "etat regulateur" (the enabling state) in the economic and social spheres.

4. Administrative reform measures required for meeting the challenges of the 21st century should include:

- involvement of trade unions, chamber of commerce, NGOs and other civil society groups in both policy formulation and execution;
- attention to relevant aspects of the traditional values and practices in each country
- rationalization and coordination of the activities of governments.

4.5 USE OF TCDC MODALITY IN ENHANCING IMPROVEMENT OF EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT

1. General Information

It was noted that the moment was propitious for developing countries to consider South-South cooperation, in particular TCDC, in developing concrete exchanges of experiences, capacities and ideas in the areas of accountability, productivity and responsiveness of the public sector.

While noting that technical cooperation on a TCDC basis does not preclude the use of traditional North-South cooperation, where appropriate, it was however necessary for Governments to consider TCDC as a viable option given its advantages for sustainability and cost effectiveness, at a time when overseas development assistance funds were on the decline. Particular mention was made of the new directions for TCDC emphasizing the role of pivotal developing countries in providing their capacities in priority areas. Furthermore, emphasis was put on the enhanced multi-dimensional information system i.e. TCDC-INRES which provides valuable information on institutional capacities of developing countries which is critical to overcome lack of awareness of such capacities.

It was recalled that among the recommendations by the UN Secretary-General in his report on Public Administration and Development to the resumed 50th session of the General Assembly, South-South cooperation, TCDC in particular, was included as a viable modality for the exchange of experiences among developing countries and countries with economies in

transition.

2. **Recommendations**

In the ensuing discussions, the main interventions were centered on the role TCDC should play in helping to identify needs and capacities that took into consideration the socio-cultural context of the region. The following recommendations were made for implementation, utilizing the TCDC and South-South Cooperation modality:

1. Publications on public administration and development, exchanges on information technologies and best practice cases in public administration should be encouraged, vigorously pursued and widely disseminated.

2. Resources should be mobilized for training and exchanges on short-term basis among developing countries.

3. International organizations, the UN in particular, and donor countries should assist the African region in utilizing its own capacities to provide training in the modernization of the national schools of public administration.

Appendix I

REGIONAL MEETING ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT TO IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT/
REUNION REGIONALE POUR L'AFRIQUE: ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT: DE L'ADJUSTEMENT STRUCTUREL A L'AMELIORATION DE L'EFFFACITE DU GOUVERNEMENT

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Appendix II

REGIONAL MEETING ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT TO IMPROVED EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT
Windhoek, 25 · 27 March 1996
PROGRAMME (Revised)

Sunday, 24 March 1996

19:00 Reception hosted by Office of the Prime Minister and United Nations in the Omatako Room

Monday, 25 March 1996

08:30 Registration

09:25 Arrival of Honourable Deputy Prime Minister, Rev Hendrik Witbooi

09:35 National Anthem

09:40 Comments by the UNDP Resident Representative Mr Steve Adei

09:55 Opening Speech by the Honourable Deputy Prime Minister, Rev. Hendrik Witbooi

10:10 Vote of thanks by representative of UNDDSMS

10: 15 Coffee

10:45 Opening remarks:

- United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Services (UN/DDSMS) - Mr. R Murapa
- French Ministry of Cooperation - Mme N Belloubet-Frier
- Economic Comission for Africa (ECA) - Mr. Ismail Ali
- Commonwealth Secretariat - Mr. Sam T. Agere
- Organization of Work - Mr. R Murapa

11 :45 **Improvement of efficiency of the Civil Service**

· General presentation by Prof. Moses Kiggundu, resource person
Moderator: Lohmeier Angula, Namibia

· General discussion

13:00 Lunch

14:30 **Productivity of the Public Service**

· Presentation by: Dr. Sam Agere, Resource Person and Advisor, Commonwealth Secretariat

· Panel: Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda and Senegal
Moderator: Morocco

· General Discussion

15:45 Coffee

16:00 **Productivity of the Public Service (cont'd)**

Tuesday 26 March 1996

08:30 **Accountability/Responsiveness of the Public Service**

. Presentation by: Mr Ladipo Adomolekun, Resource Person, and Senior Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank

· Presentation by: Mr Andrew G Bangali Resource Person

· Panel: Angola, Cape Verde, Comores, Gabon, Guinea, South Africa and Uganda
Moderator: Ghana

· General Discussion

10:30 Coffee

11 :00 General Discussion (cont'd)

13:00 Lunch

15:00 **Visit of Windhoek by participants**

Wednesday, 27 March 1996

08:30 **African Public Services in the 21st Century: Creating an Enabling Political and Administrative Environment**

- Presentation by: Mr Ismail Ali Ismail Resource Person from the Economic Commission for Africa

- Panel: Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles

Moderator: Cote d'Ivoire

- General Discussion

10:30 Coffee

11 :00 **Use of TCDC Modality in Enhancing Improvement of Efficiency in Government**

- Presentation by: Mrs Joan Archer Regional Officer for Africa, UNDP Special Unit for TCDC, New York Moderator: Sao Tome et Principe

General Discussion

12:30 Lunch

14:30 **Presentation and adoption of the report and recommendations**

17:00 **Closing of the Meeting**

UNITED
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Fiftieth session
Agenda item 12

REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Note verbale dated 4 April 1996 from the Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations has the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Interregional Technical Meeting on Restoring Government Administrative Machinery in Situations of Conflict, held at Rome from 13 to 15 March 1996 (see annex).*

It would be highly appreciated if the present note and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 12, on the occasion of the resumed session on public administration and development.

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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ANNEX

RESTORING GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY IN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT

Report of an Interregional Technical Meeting
in Rome, Italy, 13-15 March 1996

Hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy

I. INTRODUCTION

The Interregional Technical Meeting on Restoring Government Administrative Machinery in Situations of Conflict was convened in Rome, 13-15 March 1996, by the Division of Public Administration and Development Management of the United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services (UNDDSMS) in collaboration with the General Directorate of Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Italy. The major objectives of the meeting were (1) to share experiences among governments, (2) to discuss types of conflicts and their implications for the destruction and collapse of administrative machineries and the capacities of state institutions, (3) to elaborate illustrative priorities and plans of actions in the process of restoring and developing essential services with consideration to immediate, transitional and long-term priorities, and (4) to review the role of the United Nations and other donors in promoting the development of capacities of state institutions in situations of conflict.

A most critical issue underlying these objectives is "coordination", both at the national level in the affected country and within the donor community. A national government has an essential role in coordinating reconstruction of its administrative machinery. Critical issues needing attention include: (1) What are the most essential tasks to be handled by government, and how are priorities and strategies to be defined? (2) How are social integration and consensus building promoted so that public administration has the credibility to marshall support for rehabilitation policies and the capacity to implement the related programmes? (3) How can administrative institutions and their management be developed in order to lay a foundation for the peaceful management of conflicts? (4) What are the optimal linkages between the central and local government machineries, including the allocation of work among institutions? (5) What strategies are required for restoration and training of a professional civil service? (6) What strategies can be developed to improve policy development capacities within the affected country?

Likewise, coordination is a key issue within the donor community. Critical issues needing attention include: (1) How can a needs assessment be undertaken in a manner ensuring that the country-based situational needs are perceived not through standardized requirements but through transparent review of objective conditions including those capacities that persist to some degree? (2) What modalities of intervention are most appropriate for each country situation? (3) To what extent can the timing of donor assistance be adjusted to country needs?

Over 50 participants from 15 countries, and 22 international inter-governmental, professional and donor organizations, met for three days to share experiences and perspectives on strategies for rebuilding government administrative machineries during times of conflict and post-

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conflict, including strategies for institution-building and capacity-building for establishing mechanisms of conflict management and resolution. The countries involved were: Angola, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cambodia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Palestine Authority, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, and Uganda.

Other participants included representatives of the Conflict Resolution Programme of the Carter Center, European Institute for Public Administration (Maastricht), European Union's Administration of Mostar, Institute International d'Administration Publique (Paris), International Labor Organization, International Peace Academy, Transnational Foundation for Peace, United Nations Crime Prevention Centre, United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services Office in Vienna and Human Resources Project in Rome, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Office in Geneva, United Nations Office of Project Services, War-Torn Societies Project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and World Bank, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy and the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of Germany, and the Charge d'Affairs of the Office of the Government of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office in Rome, and a representative of the Russian Federation. The Meeting was chaired by the Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of Singapore.

The work of the technical meeting was carried out in plenary and small group sessions. The Opening Ceremony was addressed by Mr. Franco Frattini, Minister of Public Service, Italy; Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Director of the United Nations Office in Geneva; Mr. Gianfranco Varvesi, Deputy-Director-General for Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy; Mr. Aldo Ajello, Special Envoy of the European Union for the Great Lakes region; and Mr. Guido Bertucci, Director, Division of Public Administration and Development Management, United Nations, New York.

II. KEY ISSUES

A. Characteristics of the violent conflict

The impact on the government administrative machinery and the consequent strategies for improvement thereto can vary depending upon the characteristics of the violent conflict. For instance, many violent conflicts are based on ethnicity, sub-nationalism or clan. In these cases, the conflict manifests itself geographically, and a strategy for conflict resolution may involve a territorial element, ranging from adoption of a federal state to a mere deconcentration of administrative apparatus staffed by local residents who are sensitive to local issues and perspectives. On the other hand, a violent conflict which is class-based may require targeted social policies that emphasize equity and fairness.

The characteristics of the violence also play a role in the administrative mechanisms that are associated with the healing process. If the various sides of the conflict have engaged in conventional warfare, a peace accord may serve effectively to establish a formula for power-sharing and policy-making that can bridge the gap among the groups. If the conflict has been characterized more by guerrilla warfare, a strategy that identifies combatants as "bandits" rather than rebels may succeed in rallying the majority of people to reap the benefits of peace and to discourage continuance of skirmishes. On the other hand, if the war has escalated to genocide, it may be more difficult to establish a basis for peace and mutual respect, and a period of justice-seeking may need to accompany the establishment a viable, integrative governmental machinery.

Another critical variable is the time dimension. While members of the international community may seek substantial, clear and early results from peace efforts, it is common for a violent conflict to have been simmering for some time, even for generations, and to be viewed by the combatants as intractable in the short term even if solvable in the long term. A long-term

perspective is reinforced by various different cultural views of time, many of which intimately link people with their ancestors and their descendants. In extended conflicts, people adhere to the cleavages in society and may view progress towards peace on very long-term, incremental basis. A current skirmish may be one of many iterations of a dispute which is decades-old, if not centuries-old. Western donors can become impatient with the pace of progress of reconstruction, and especially peace-building, because they may have failed to appreciate the full temporal dimension of the conflict.

Likewise, the ease of re-building government administrative machinery may depend upon the extent of involvement of these machineries in the war/conflict government institutions. For instance, if the courts were used to falsely accuse people, then it is difficult for the courts to play a role in reconstruction. Or if the public service was used to promote only certain persons, then a recruitment exercise during the reconstruction may be assumed to be biased and to require extraordinary measures in order to establish a reputation for fairness and objectivity.

As well, the nature and degree of foreign involvement in the violent conflict may affect the degree to which some donors are able to participate in reconstruction. In some cases, donor agencies or national companies have sold arms, trained soldiers or provided economic or social sustenance. Under these circumstances, the affected country may demand compensatory assistance or may reject offers of restitution. With a strong government machinery, an affected country can define a new relationship with the implicated governments. There are also circumstances in which multi-lateral agencies can objectivity assist the affected country in its restoration efforts without reference to previous international involvements in the struggles. On the other hand, given the increase in the incidence of multi-lateral involvement in peace-building and peace-keeping processes, it is increasingly likely that an affected country could view the United Nations or its agencies as culpable, thereby reducing the effectiveness of UN mediation and reconstruction efforts.

B. Characteristics of the government administrative machinery

A starting point for restoring government administrative machinery in situations of conflict is an assessment of the existing administrative network. In some cases, the administrative machinery is in tact and adversely affected only by orientation of budget priorities to military purposes. If a national governmental machinery exists, then assessment can be made concerning its financial, human and material resources capacity. This capacity assessment can be most effectively accomplished by a joint Government-donor community team, thereby combining understanding of local conditions and needs with donor capacity and interest. Although there is a tendency for humanitarian and technical assistance to be donor-driven in complex emergency situations, the inclusion of Government on assessment and management teams increases the likelihood of relevance and sustainability.

In the most extreme cases, the national government no longer functions or operates only within a limited territory. Infrastructure has been damaged, supplies have been looted and personnel killed or missing. Restoration is most difficult when damage has been greatest and especially where personnel costs have been high. Where the governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations, and basic social structures have been decimated, those people who are left cannot find familiar frameworks for mutual trust and assistance. Under these extreme circumstances, the restoration process is not only physical, economic and social, but also psychological. Rebuilding programmes in all these areas depend upon the existence of a minimum level of government activity to assess needs, set priorities and organize programmes. Thus, long-term development depends upon the restoration of government administrative machinery.

Restoration efforts are affected by the characteristics of the government administrative machinery prior to the violent conflict. If the government administration was well-articulated,

with clear policy-setting mechanisms, strong implementation agencies and a reputation for delivering needed services to the people, then the goal of restoration will have a reasonable target concept which would be well-understood by the government officials as well as the people. If the previous governmental machinery was decentralized or at least deconcentrated to levels close to the grass roots, the local people will be able to articulate their expectations in a realistic manner. If services were delivered effectively and efficiently, there will be a high standard by which to assess restoration efforts. If government business had been carried out in a transparent and accountable manner, the people will be able to participate in restoration efforts because they will be knowledgeable and accustomed to participation in the machineries of government. Because restoration processes are expensive and time-consuming, it is useful to fully involve citizens not only so that they will understand the difficulties and the successes, but also so that they can participate in restoration processes at local levels.

It is equally important to note the extent to which the prior administrative machinery was modern, up-to-date, and reflecting the best means for setting and implementing government policies. A restoration process provides an opportunity to re-think the missions of the State and the means of achieving those tasks designated for government responsibility. To the extent that every modern government is in the process of "re-inventing" or "re-engineering" itself, the restoration process provides an added incentive because many government processes are no longer on-going, but have ceased to operate. This temporary cessation of government work provides an opportunity to consider questions like: What should the State be responsible for in society? How should the State accomplish its tasks? and what government administrative machinery can best support the accomplishment of these tasks?

C. Socio-economic conditions and potential

The restoration of government administrative machinery takes place in a socio-economic context. It is necessary to consider the current and potential economic performance of the country, giving due notice to the extent of natural resources and their proper exploitation within a framework of sustainability and respect for the environment. Taking into account demographics, an economic analysis can also give due attention to per capita income, as well as income distribution and concentration of wealth. The extent of private sector development can also provide a potential for economic development. As well, non-governmental organizations and professional and social societies provide a framework for participation in socio-economic reconstruction. Basic infrastructure would also be assessed, often leading to the possibility of leap-frogging intermediate infrastructure, such as antiquated telephone systems, in favor of advanced forms of telecommunications. Basic conditions, and a cost-benefit analysis of new technology, provide a realistic base for rebuilding or extending infrastructure and economic development.

To the extent that distribution of wealth and socio-economic opportunities may have played a role in creating or exacerbating the violent conflict, this distribution needs to be taken into account in restoration strategies.

D. Restoration of Government Administrative Machinery within Conflict Situation

The government administrative machinery is both a victim and a solution. First, government administrative machinery is a sought-after prize of social conflict and often breaks down under war-like conditions of upheaval, uncertainty and distrust. But while the processes of government are disrupted, it is this same government administration which can be re-oriented to establish a basis for the renewal of social and economic life.

Operating under conditions of social and economic upheaval, the government machinery can provide a framework for setting priorities for the society, for enabling the economic engine of growth to reassert itself, and for establishing mechanisms for peaceful social interaction. This

administrative machinery can re-establish needed social services, essential infrastructure such as roads and telecommunications, credit institutions, sharing of information through media and through social interactions, and legal mechanisms for settling contract disputes as well as identifying and punishing criminal behavior. The government institutions accomplish these tasks in three ways: (1) through organizing the government itself to establish policies and implement necessary programmes to support the reconstruction strategies of communities throughout the country, (2) through enabling private sector development, and (3) through encouraging non-governmental organizations to participate in community life.

This complex situation contains many interrelated elements, each of which cannot be dealt with in isolation, but must be approached within a holistic, integrated framework. Social trust can be increased through a predictable legal system based on rule of law. With "no one" above the law, everyone can engage in social and economic activities knowing that a fair, impartial, and predictable system of adjudication awaits any disputes. Without this "rule of law", individuals and communities feel justified in "taking the law into their own hands or acting above the law". The development of mutual trust results from the cessation of open hostilities, but evolving trust also contributes to the cessation of open hostilities. The knowledge that an effective and efficient government administrative machinery is in place can act as a damper against future violent activities. Likewise, the government administrative machinery is strengthened with every passing day of peace. Development and peace are inextricably linked, and must be engaged simultaneously.

An emerging post-conflict situation is indeed in the midst of a delicate and subtle process, just as likely to slip backwards into the abyss of violence as to confirm peaceful tendencies. Societies must be able to imagine peaceful resolution of conflict, and to trust that their leaders and the government administrative machinery will not only support but also enforce the mutual, cooperative strategies of individuals and communities. By leading to the establishment of trust and confidence, effective government administrative machinery can shed its image as a victim of destruction and emerge as a protagonist in the restoration of the social and economic life of the country.

These critical activities require strong capacity in both coordination of priority setting and effectiveness of operations. Government priorities represent agreed-upon policy decisions concerning the future directions of social and economic policies. The very existence of a policy-development exercise which is inclusive and participative of various interests (especially prior combatants), is a testament to the rebuilding of the political fabric of the society. The establishment of administrative machinery for governmental operations leads not only to the delivery of needed services but also to the rebirth of confidence in national political and administrative processes. Commitment to individual, family and community development reinforces the central role of government administrative machinery to facilitate sustainable development.

Also, this same government administrative machinery can play a strong role in coordination of donors. Without a government machinery capable of developing political priorities and implementing government programmes, a worn-torn society can continue to be at the mercy of the international community, which best focuses on its perception of the interests of the society, and at worst focuses on the priorities of the international donor agencies who may have even been connected to the dynamics of the violent conflict. A strong government administrative machinery can provide focus and direction for the relief and development activities of the international community.

The international community, often led by the United Nations or a focal donor agency, is involved in the delivery of inputs, services, and technical assistance, thereby leading, under the best circumstances, to relief of suffering and deprivation, to the rebuilding of key infrastructures, and at the same time, to the establishment of institutions and capacities that can quickly assume responsibility for social and economic development. To maximize these international

contributions to peace-building, peace-keeping and restoration of social, political and economic life, the international community must be coordinated for the effective and efficient delivery of international assistance and to set a good example of cooperation in the achievement of an agreed-upon goal.

These national and international level activities succeed best when they are contextually sensitive. Restoration processes can build upon those social and economic processes which have persisted throughout or emerged from the conflict in the various communities in the affected country. While acknowledging the characteristics of the conflict, and the possibility of slipping back into conflict, national and international leaders can design restoration process to reduce possibility of violent conflict in future. While conflict is inherent in all human relations, it is possible to design political and governmental operations in order to facilitate the peaceful management of conflict; that is mechanisms for settling disputes and designing fair, equitable and appropriate futures for the society. Attention can be paid to managing conflict in situations which are pre-violence, within violent circumstances and post-violence.

Conflict management or resolution can take forms which are formal, informal or embedded in the way a government operates and relates to society. Strategies for conflict management depend not only upon court systems and alternative dispute mechanisms, but also upon the procedures of government in which all citizens may participate in deciding priorities, methods of implementing programmes, and optimal ways of applying government machineries to the betterment of the lives of the citizens.

Conflict management is a critical issue for both governments and the international community affected by violent conflict. Instability, uncertainty and lack of safety are detriments to social and economic development, as well as impediments to national integration into the global economy and the global village.

III. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

A. National Leadership in Restoration Processes

The process of restoration involves many inter-related management tasks, not the least of which is priority-setting. It is only the affected government that can legitimately determine how to rebuild a social, economic and political society from the remains of a violent conflict. Those affected by the violence best understand the manifestations of that violence in the social, economic and political institutions of the society. While it may seem temporarily easier to relinquish responsibility for directing the restoration effort, and it may be difficult to achieve consensus among those who have been combatants, there is an element of reconciliation inherent in the process of negotiating sufficiently to provide some guidelines for the restoration process. These guidelines can serve not only to direct donor assistance but also to focus government efforts, especially with multi-sectoral, integrated development strategies.

The creation of national policy guidelines constitutes the establishment of minimum governing processes, thereby leading to further elaboration of not only decision-making institutions but also institutions for implementation and coordination. By exercising leadership in policy-making and coordination, the affected government builds its capacity to govern, contributes to national reconciliation, and builds confidence among citizens and former-combatants during the transition to normalcy.

Although there are a few cases where there may be no national government during a transition stage, there is usually at least a reconciliation council and there may also be local or regional governmental institutions that can be constituted to form a temporary leadership structure.

Without government leadership in policy-setting and coordination, the international community may establish programmes that are inappropriate, wasteful, insensitive to local conditions and lead to conflict rather than reconciliation.

B. Effective Coordination within the Government

Among the Government institutions, consideration must be paid to coordination in order to organize the optimal use of resources and to create agreement on the future direction of the society. This coordination involves agreement on the role of the State, the tasks of the various administrative machineries, and mechanisms for transparent communications among the machineries. Effective coordination also integrates a transparent monitoring capacity in order to ensure effective utilizationof resources and to assess changing needs. While donor agencies attempt to monitor implementation, it is a task best accomplished by the Government administrative machinery, which needs to fully develop and utilize this monitoring capacity in its day-to-day operations in the long-term. Monitoring involves information management, and donors can contribute to short term successes, as well as to long-term development, by training personnel and supplying equipment for monitoring purposes.

Governments carrying out restoration of administrative machinery have created a node for national coordination of administrative improvements. This node is usually an inter-ministerial body or linked to a very high-level unit, such as the Prime Minister's Office. Only from such a vantage point can administrative reform be coordinated.

C. Strong Governance Capacity

Effective government administrative machinery benefits from mutual relations with a strong parliament, constructively-oriented NGOs and media, and private sector led/driven economic development. These governance elements are often the victims of civil strife and the nurturing of their re-development can contribute to the stabilization of peaceful dialogue. With well-articulated policy institutions, media, NGOs and private sector, the government administrative machinery has a wider network of partners with an investment in stability.

D. Rule of law

Establishment of justice and security within a context of "rule of law" can contribute to a "level playing field" for social, economic and political development and especially reconciliation. Citizens need to know that their economic efforts will be safeguarded, their property rights enforced and their lives protected. Careful attention needs to be given to the handling of cases that arise during the early periods of the restoration in order to build confidence in the judicial and security institutions. These issues are most important in those situations in which former combatants are accused on serious crimes, such as genocide.

E. Culture of cooperation

It is essential to establish a "culture of cooperation" to encourage tolerance and willingness to coordinate operations: (a) within the UN System/family, (b) within the international community, (c) between government institutions, and (d) between the government and the international community. Within the government administrative machinery, and especially when former combatants are working side-by-side, there needs to be established programmes of training, monitoring and rewards for cooperation. Similar recognition can be organized for cooperative behavior within the UN System/family and the international community.

F. Linkage between Government-wide administrative frameworks and management improvement programmes in operational ministries

It is useful to coordinate the development of general administrative frameworks and their implantation in operational ministries with programmes for management improvement in those ministries; this coordination is both intra-governmental and intra-UN System, especially coordinating the specialized agencies. Very often separate ministries and agencies develop management improvements, but do not share their experiences with other units of government. As well, in establishing central frameworks for personnel management, financial management and materials management, the government needs to ensure that the line ministries have input into the development of these frameworks and integrate these frameworks into their operations. In essential areas of handling personnel, money and materials, there need to be transparent, objective measures of utilization.

G. Territorially based development strategies

Emphasis should be placed on territorially-based development (rather than specialized interest), thereby reinforcing and strengthening local government and administration. A key element of any national administrative framework is the development of administrative units at grass roots level, well within the reach of the most rural citizens. To encourage this development, strategies for re-vitalization of the social and economic life of the citizens should be focused on territorially based units. This focus can also lead to greater participation of citizens in the decisions that most directly affect their lives. Within territorial administrations, attention needs to be paid to enabling full participation and transparency.

H. Training of human resources

In post-conflict situations, training of human resources is a most critical activity. Violent conflicts usually result in loss of lives, and often the lives of those who have been trained to contribute to social and economic development. One element of training will be to replace the skills and knowledge base that has been lost to the society and to the administrative machinery. Another element of training will be to focus on those skills that can contribute to reconciliation; namely, negotiation skills, cooperative behavior and coordination mechanisms. It is necessary to build understanding and appreciation of each other, and at the same time, have available tools for resolving conflicts peacefully. It is not uncommon for past conflicts to become manifest in inter-ministerial or inter-institutional disagreements, for which transparent methods of conflict resolution will be especially useful. Also, due to the fact that most combatants are men, there is usually a post-conflict skewing of the population towards a greater proportion of women, many of whom may not have had opportunities for higher education and specialized training. It is useful to provide management training for women so that they can match managerial skills with their experiences and contribute to the operation of the government administrative machinery.

I. Strategy of building upon successes

Within programmes to restore government administrative machinery, it is essential to achieve modest but consistent successes, thereby building confidence internally and credibility with donors. When the government has been temporarily inoperative or giving attention to war rather than civilian interests, it is very important to provide a clear and consistent signal that the government is serious. Because actions are more convincing than words, it is important to achieve some successes, however modest. These successes are most impressive if they affect positively the lives of the grass roots people. Examples include: credit programmes, health care, education and jobs. Although national level policy development is important in the long term, local people in communities will begin to believe that a "long-term is coming" if they can see some positive results of government action in the short run. Because confidence-building plays a large role in restoration in post-conflict situations, visible successes need to be achieved at any cost. Effectiveness is more important than efficiency in the short term. Once a platform of popular goodwill is established, administrators can take greater care in minimizing expenditures. It may be

necessary to reject cost-effective strategies in favor of more expensive but extremely visible strategies.

J. Characteristics of exemplary strategies

Participants at the Technical Meeting identified useful elements from the experiences of all participating countries. For purposes of example, the report will note three cases in particular: Cambodia, Lebanon and Rwanda.

In Cambodia, as in other countries, the conflicts have been exacerbated by regional issues. Likewise, governments in the region have taken an interest in the restoration process. After more than 20 years of conflicts, and a two-year stabilization period led by the United Nations, the Royal Government of Cambodia is in the process of restoring its operations, while at the same time modernizing its functioning and redesigning its policies to facilitate improved interaction with the regional and global economies. To facilitate modernization, the Government has established an Inter-Ministerial Technical Commission for Administrative Reform, with a small operational executive staff. This commission oversees a reform programme consisting of five parts: (1) restructuring the public sector, (2) strengthening the management of line ministries, (3) reforming civil service management, (4) developing human resources for the public sector, and (5) strengthening provincial administration. As well, the Government has revised legal frameworks, financial management, and international cooperative relations.

In Lebanon, the National Administrative Rehabilitation Programme is within the Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform. While focused on the long-term goal of rebuilding an efficient, modern and lean public administration, this programme is currently identifying immediate technical assistance needs and formulating propocals to restore the operational capacity of key public institutions. Objectives include: responsiveness to citizens' needs; cost-effective operations; capacity to plan, implement and evaluate; private sector development; and increased transparency and accountability in government. The programme envisions greater public participation in governance, attracting qualified individuals to the civil service, streamlining and modernizing administrative and legal procedures and decentralizing certain public functions by empowering local governments. Within the Ministry, a Technical Cooperation Unit assists line ministries and public agencies in appraising institutional rehabilitation needs, mobilizes donor resources, monitors and evaluates progress, and facilitates coordination and communication within the Government and with the donors. Three major areas of technical assistance involve: physical rehabilitation, human resources development and information technology.

In Rwanda, although the country is focused on justice administration in dealing with the aftermath of the genocide, there is considerable attention to restoring the government administrative machinery. The restoration programme focuses on the ministries of public service, finance, interior and communal development, justice, planning and the prime minister's office. Due to the immense human cost of the genocide and the exile of many civil servants, human resources development is a most critical element of the programme. Within the first year, two major activities have been carried out: (1) census of civil servants, and (2) recruitment for positions of directors, division directors, chiefs of services, and head of public enterprises. The census of civil servants served the short term purpose of determining human resources capacity and needs, while laying the basis for long-term human resources management. The recruitment exercise, involving objective, written examinations, resulted in filling key upper and middle level management positions with qualified persons, while also contributing to modernization of recruitment procedures and reconciliation through creating a multi-ethnic, merit-oriented senior civil service. The programme which has a large component to re-tool and re-equip the ministries and to modernize their management and information systems, is coordinated by an inter-ministerial committee and a programme office composed of national staff.

IV. ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

A. Responsiveness to country conditions and government priorities

First and foremost, the international community is reminded of the importance of the availability of financial resources (pledges from donors which translate into concrete financial resources) to assist the reconstruction process. For maximum impact and best coordination with other donors, timely pledging and transfer of funds is important.

The participants noted that efforts need to be made to involve the government administrative machinery in identification of needs and priorities for capacity-building, and in developing agreement concerning programmes of action. International interventions are most useful when they integrate with local development initiatives by building upon what already exists in the country, especially at the community level. The participants noted that despite wide-spread violence, there often persisted or developed local community activities, which should not be ignored by donors.

Because local initiatives derive from several sources, it is suggested that international agencies review development initiatives at various sites, especially those that are more difficult to reach; namely, traditional and/or rural communities. Often, some communities are either especially innovative and therefore worthy of attention and emulation, or they have benefited from being remote from the violence of the conflict. In these areas, it is possible to experience relevant and appropriate development initiatives, and even to locate persons able to lead development efforts and train others in innovative development initiatives. These isolated communities can be an unexpected source of expertise.

In the effort to restore government administrative machinery, it is important that service delivery decisions reinforce the restorative process. In particular, government administrative machineries should not be marginalized by over-attention to non-governmental organizations. Although some governmental machineries may be weak, they will be further marginalized if all development and humanitarian assistance is funneled through a non-governmental sector. In the restoration process, it is essential that the government administrative machinery achieve a reputation for effectiveness. At a policy level, the government can allocate certain functions to the NGO sector and retain certain functions in the government administration; or alternatively, the government can retain responsibility for all services, but arrange for service delivery by NGOs or local governments. It is useful for a government administration to self-analyze to determine its strengths and weaknesses and to develop a profile of capable organizations in the non-governmental sector. The government can encourage donors to work with capable NGOs, within a framework of mulit-sectoral coordination established at policy level in government.

B. Simplified and streamlined procedures for delivering technical assistance

Restoration of government administrative machinery is an urgent requirement if post-conflict humanitarian crises are to develop into government-led development programmes and to contribute to embedding the peace into the landscape of society. Under conditions of re-starting government operations, speedy delivery of inputs such as equipment and training is essential. While acknowledging the need for planning, participants suggested "rapid appraisal" processes to shorten the lead time in delivering technical assistance. As well, some "red tape" procedures can be waived under emergency conditions in order to speed up delivery. It was generally acknowledged that peace can be a fragile situation that requires reinforcement through normalization of conditions in the country. A major advancement in normalization is the re-establishment of government administrative operations, which can not only begin to restore development programmes, but also begin to handle the implementation of technical assistance.

It would be useful to develop a rapid-response approach to management of technical assistance in urgent, complex emergencies. It is acknowledged that some donors and some agencies have initiated streamlined procedures to better coordination and faster delivery of technical assistance. It is possible to analyze in order to uncover hidden efficiencies of each and every management tool, such as, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

C. Coordination within the International Community

Assistance to the restoration of government administrative machinery is a complex task requiring large donor inputs, necessitating a large number of donors. In order to ensure cost-effectiveness and timely delivery of inputs, strong coordination is required. While the affected government has the greatest responsibility to coordinate donor activity, it is acknowledged that in situations in which the government administrative machinery is being restored, there is need for international coordination of donors. To maximize the use of limited resources and to mobilize funds from all available sources, it is suggested that the United Nations facilitate the participation of bi-lateral donors by developing with the affected government a framework for restoration, including processes to integrate smoothly the inputs of the various bi-lateral donors.

The participants noted the need to coordinate organizational procedures and priorities within the UN System/family itself. They noted that inter-agency coordination is often frustrated by non-synchronized planning, budgeting and staffing cycles. Given that an increasingly large proportion of technical assistance appears to be allocated to countries in some degree of a recovery and reconstruction process, with tight time-frame requirements, it is imperative that UN departments and agencies harmonize their programming in order to cooperate at the field level.

High profile activities, such as roundtables and consultative group processes are indeed beneficial for raising and allocating funds, but the participants suggested more attention to lower profile activities, such as joint programming missions. These missions have the advantage of enabling participants from several interested donors and agencies to view jointly the conditions in the affected country and to compose a shared perception of the needs. By working jointly with the government in defining needs and strategies, there is transparency and continuity to the collaborative process. By jointly developing a common framework, strong commitment by the government and the donors emerges and can serve as an engine to keep the technical assistance on track. Although such a common framework would be useful in any development endeavor, it is especially essential when the object of assistance is the government's own administrative machinery. In this case, there needs to be strong leadership from the affected government and commitment from all donors to work transparently for improved management of administrative machineries, on which all development efforts ultimately depend.

D. Balanced attention to emergency/relief operations and long-term development needs, especially dimensions of sustainable development

The participants noted that relief efforts often involve elements of dependency and distortion. Most often seen in the economic field where availability of foodstuffs frustrates national production and distribution, these distortions can equally develop in social sectors in which communities come to depend upon the initiative of outsiders to identify and meet their needs. Care must be taken to resist tendencies of donor agencies to "take over" functions of government administration.

Even relief efforts can be conceptualized strategically in order to plant the seeds of long-term, sustainable development. For instance, operations can be converted to use local language(s). National experts and recipients can be trained to perform administrative tasks, or alternatively, some administrative tasks can be simplified and/or eliminated in order to allow greater flexibility in local communities. The process of delivering emergency relief need not be

disabling; it can be empowering to review processes and the development of national capacities in order to transfer functions to national authorities.

The participants also noted that in "managing the transition" to greater involvement of the government administrative machinery, attention can be addressed to transforming the administrative institutions and their capacity rather than simply rebuilding former institutions and training for former capacity needs. There is an opportunity to combine development with relief when a government decides that modernization and reconciliation require different or more sophisticated methods and equipment. It is likely that during a period of extended conflict, some nationals had the benefit of training and even experience in operating the "latest, more up-to-date" administrative methods and technology. The affected government can take advantage of this experience by leap-frogging intermediate advances and moving to the most modern methods of administration and management. While other countries are struggling to re-engineer their bureaucracies, the affected government can take advantage of the temporary disarray to re-think the goals and methods of government operations and to upgrade these operations without encountering resistance to change from entrenched employees. In a restoration environment, there is enthusiasm for new arrangements, methods, technology and people. It is possible to grab a small victory out of the difficulties created by massive destruction of administrative machinery, there linking development to relief.

E. Expansion of menu of options for government activities

Participants suggested that in the restoration process, governments would appreciate as wide a variety of reform ideas as possible. Especially if certain administrative technologies are associated with past practices against any population, it is desirable to restructure administrative work to symbolize a new framework for operations in the future. And in the restoration process, it is possible to take advantage of modern administrative developments, particularly noting that almost all governments are in the process of making some improvements in their administration organization and management. Further, it is noted that countries emerging from conflict situations would want to take advantage of the modern strategies that emphasize collaboration and cooperation. By utilizing methodologies that reward joint behavior and team work, these governments can reinforce aspects of national reconciliation.

In the sensitive area of government administrative machinery and operations, many practices are tied to colonial history or ties with various allies. In deciding to modernize administrative operations after a violent conflict, it may be useful to have advice from a wide variety of systems in a neutral environment in which experts from many perspectives can work together and with the government. In this sensitive subject, the United Nations can provide the most neutral of environments, with the widest variety of perspectives.

F. Special agenda for technical assistance under extreme conditions of time-sensitive emergencies

Although there are many common agenda for social and economic development, the situation of post-conflict emergencies requires special programmes and considerations. It is acknowledged that there may be a justification for encouraging or permitting some activities that otherwise might be unusual; such as, assistance to police, prisons, or judiciary. Given the delicacy of justice and security in post-conflict situations, special arrangements can be made to assist in stabilizing security or punishing violators of human rights.

Likewise, while it is somewhat unusual to assist legislatures, these policy-making institutions have a major role to play in reconciliation and often provide a transparent locus for national debate and decision-making. It is suggested to assist parliament especially in the area of training, policy analysis, information processing and monitoring of social and economic needs.

Finally, it is possible to imagine encouraging some tendencies that would be considered

inefficient under more normal conditions. For instance, while emerging from a conflict, it may be desirable to hire ex-combatants into government employment, for purposes of national reconciliation and job creation. While such a strategy is usually deplored as wasteful and inappropriate, it may be one good method for bringing harmony to the political arena.

G. Improve communications to facilitate information sharing between governments which are restoring their administrative machineries

As many governments are experiencing the challenge of restoring their administrative machinery in situations of conflict, it may be useful to develop mechanisms to improve communications in order to facilitate information sharing between these governments. These governments may seek to share information about innovations in administrative mechanisms and technologies, economic revival and development strategies, and socio-political integration/reconciliation methodologies. It would be useful to development an on-line facility based on the neutral ground of the United Nations for sharing experiences and expertise. In the spirit of "Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC)", such a facility could serve as government-to-government communications link. It would be useful to extend the facilities developed by UNDDSMS for the UN General Assembly 50th Resumed Session as a "virtual network".

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. The Government administrative machinery has an essential and indispensable role in rebuilding war-torn societies, focusing especially on facilitating social communication, political agenda setting, economic development, and leading to the re-knitting of the fabrics of socio-economic life.

B. National capacity assessment can be most effectively accomplished by a joint Government-donor community team, thereby combining understanding of local conditions and needs with donor capacity and interest.

C. Government administrative machinery can be designed to facilitate transparent communications and cooperation, thereby leading to effective coordination both in mechanisms for development and in a spirit of national reconciliation.

D. Government administrative machinery can build confidence and credibility through achieving consistent, effective and efficient programmatic successes.

E. The international community can focus on well-timed technical interventions in partnership with the National Government, within a framework of long-term, sustainable development framework.

F. The international community can improve its coordination of technical assistance at the country level through harmonizing and streamlining its administrative cycles and procedures.

G. The international community can integrate short term emergency relief into long term development frameworks, emphasizing national capacity-building.

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FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/50/650/Add.2), which contains the revised budget of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1996 and revises annexes I, III, V, VIII and IX to document A/50/650/Add.1, providing information on the resources provided for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1995. The Advisory Committee also considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/50/650/Add.3), containing the proposed budget for the Mission for the 12-month period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997. During its consideration of both reports, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information.

2. The Security Council, by its resolution 866 (1993) of 22 September 1993, established UNOMIL for an initial period of seven months. Its mandate has since then been extended and adjusted by subsequent Security Council resolutions, the latest being resolution 1041 (1996) of 29 January 1996, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission for four months, from 1 February to 31 May 1996.

3. As indicated in paragraphs 16 and 17 of document A/50/650/Add.3, the total resources made available to the Mission from its inception until 31 March 1996 amount to $101,512,300 gross. Estimated expenditures total $80,939,000 gross and credits returned to Member States amount to $20,573,300 gross. Furthermore, $79,134,808 has been assessed on Member States from inception to 31 March 1996; contributions received amount to $54,823,393; and outstanding assessments were reduced by $163,022, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 50/83 of 15 December 1995, resulting in a shortfall of $24,148,393. The Advisory Committee reiterates the need for Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time.

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4. Paragraph 19 of the report indicates that the Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in Liberia, established in 1993 by the Secretary-General to receive voluntary contributions from Member States in support of the deployment of peace-keeping troops, of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the demobilization of combatants, elections and humanitarian assistance, had secured, as at 29 February 1996, contributions totalling $24 million for deployment and maintenance of ECOMOG and for humanitarian assistance.

5. The Committee also notes that, according to paragraph 3 of the report, the Secretary-General has informed the Security Council that on 27 October 1995 he co-chaired a conference on assistance to Liberia with the chairmen of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Liberian Council of State, which resulted in pledges of $145.7 million for humanitarian assistance, demobilization, rehabilitation and ECOMOG. These pledges, however, have been provided on a bilateral basis and are thus not managed through the Trust Fund.

6. In its resolution 50/210 of 23 December 1995, the General Assembly authorized the appropriation and assessment of $8,193,000 gross ($7,730,800 net) for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1995, and provided resources amounting to $21,943,200 gross ($21,447,000 net) for the period from 1 January to 31 March 1996. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee, in view of the Security Council's extension of the mandate of UNOMIL from 1 February to 31 May 1996 (resolution 1041 (1996) of 29 January 1996), authorized the Secretary-General to utilize resources already made available for the period ending 31 March 1996, to meet the continuing costs, pending consideration and decision in this regard by the General Assembly.

Revised cost estimates for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1996

7. The revised estimates presented in document A/50/650/Add.2, for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1996, amount to $26,753,700 gross ($25,851,100 net). This estimate is $9,272,100 gross ($9,361,900 net) higher than the original cost estimate of $17,481,600 gross ($16,489,200 net) submitted in the previous report of the Secretary-General (A/50/650/Add.1, annex III). The Committee was informed that the operational plan for the period from 1 July to 31 December 1995 was not implemented as envisaged by the Secretary-General, and that resources earmarked for disarmament and demobilization of combatants were not used, thus accounting for the reductions of $10,855,500 in non-recurrent costs and $3,067,600 in recurrent costs (see A/50/650/Add.2, annex I). Those requirements, however, which amount to $11,466,100, have been rolled over to the next budget period, from 1 January to 30 June 1996, thus resulting in the increase mentioned above.

8. The breakdown of the revised estimates for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1996 is presented in annex III to the Secretary-General's report (A/50/650/Add.2), along with supplementary information contained in annex IV.

9. The Advisory Committee, however, wishes to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the absence of performance reports. As stated in its report on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peace-keeping operation (A/49/664, para. 36), "performance reports are

of critical importance not only in understanding what has happened, and what is happening, but also in arriving at a considered judgement as to what will be required in the future". In the same document, the Advisory Committee not only reiterated its recommendations regarding improvements in the presentation of performance reports, it also indicated the need to improve the time lag for the preparation of performance reports.

10. During its consideration of the revised cost estimates, the Advisory Committee raised several questions regarding the political situation in Liberia to supplement the information contained in the Secretary-General's report of 23 January 1996 to the Security Council (S/1996/47). Paragraph 17 of the report indicates that no progress was being reported in the disengagement of forces at the time, and that, for the most part, factions continued to occupy their positions and maintain checkpoints. Furthermore, the deployment of UNOMIL, to its total authorized military strength of 160, depends on the deployment of ECOMOG troops, which suffered a serious setback after the Tubmanburg incident of 28 December 1995, and on progress in the peace process. Security conditions thus delay the rehabilitation of the facilities for the process of disarmament and demobilization, as indicated in paragraph 21 of the report.

11. Representatives of the Secretary-General acknowledge that the deterioration in the political situation has had an effect on the planning for disarmament and demobilization. However, they indicated that after extensive consultations a revised plan had been devised and accepted by ECOMOG, UNOMIL and the Liberian National Transitional Government, providing for two consecutive phases of deployment for a period of four weeks each, awaiting only the final endorsement of the Council of State. The first phase, now delayed to the end of April, would entail the disarmament and demobilization of 50 per cent of each faction's combatants at five demobilization sites. The remaining combatants would be disarmed and demobilized at nine demobilization sites during July 1996. The Committee was informed that rehabilitation of the facilities requires two to three weeks and that calculations have been done on the basis of 60,000 combatants to be demobilized.

12. The revised cost estimates provide for the phased increase in the number of military observers from 75 to 160 by 15 April 1996, and an increase in the number of civilian staff to 618 by the addition of a senior electoral officer at the P-5 level. Upon inquiry, the Committee was informed that 94 military observers were on board as at 26 March 1996, the additional to be deployed as required. Likewise, the Committee was informed that the vacancy rates of mission personnel, excluding the staff for the demobilization programme (15 at the P-3 level, 364 local staff and 91 United Nations Volunteers) stood at 31 per cent for international staff, 7 per cent for local staff and 5 per cent for United Nations Volunteers. Since the revised costs have been calculated on the basis of full incumbency, the Committee expects that savings that may arise in relation to this item will be reflected in the performance report covering the period or rolled over to the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, as indicated in the annex to the present report.

13. The Advisory Committee notes that provision for assistance for disarmament and demobilization is indicated in paragraphs 18 and 19 of annex IV to document A/50/650/Add.2 and supplementary information is contained in paragraphs 109

to 122 of annex II to document A/50/650/Add.1. A requirement for a non-recurrent cost of $5,958,000 was rolled over from the period ending 31 December 1995 for rehabilitation and reintegration to demobilized military forces, as well as $2,412,000 for assistance to demobilized military forces.

14. In this connection, the Advisory Committee notes the statement made by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council, dated 23 October 1995 (S/1995/881), in particular paragraph 48 thereof:

> "Accordingly, it is envisaged that assistance for the demobilization process will be provided under the assessed budget, including short-term assistance to help combatants for a two- or three-month period following demobilization, after which they will be absorbed into the reintegration programmes. However, if voluntary contributions are made available to bridge the gap between demobilization and reintegration, the assessed budget will be reduced accordingly. All other programmes related to reintegration will be funded by voluntary contributions from the donor community."

15. In the light of the delays in the implementation of the operational plan and, in particular, the launching of the disarmament and demobilization programme, the Advisory Committee inquired about the cost implications implied. Requirements for three months (April-June) had been included in the January-June 1996 budget, and for one month (July) in the July 1996-June 1997 budget. The cost implications of the delay in the disarmament and demobilization programme from 1 April to 1 May 1996 will result in a reduction of $5,158,900 gross ($5,107,300 net) in the cost estimates for the period from 1 January to 30 June 1996. However, the amount of the reduction is still required and thus expected to be rolled over to the period beginning 1 July 1996, with an expected date of completion of the four-month programme by 31 August 1996. A summary of these implications is submitted in the annex to the present report.

16. The Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council (S/1996/47), recommended the establishment of an electoral component to enable the United Nations to play an effective role in the Liberian electoral process for the presidential and legislative elections which are scheduled to take place in August, in accordance with the terms of the Abuja Agreement. Pending a final decision by the Security Council in this regard, and the recommendations of a planned technical mission, a provision is made, in paragraph 15 of Annex IV to document A/50/650/Add.2, for the recruitment of two experts on elections to conduct the survey mission, at a cost of $10,000 (including round-trip air fares and daily subsistence for 10 days each), as well as for a consultancy fee of $5,600 for a total of 20 days. The Committee was informed, however, that the full requirement for the election component will be presented at a later date as revised cost estimates to the 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997 budget period.

17. An additional requirement of $1,381,200 is introduced in item 5, transportation operations, covering the purchase of vehicles and workshop equipment. The Committee was informed that this was due to the roll-over of the non-recurrent cost for freight related to the transfer of 107 vehicles from other missions anticipated in the current period.

18. The Advisory Committee notes that there is a reduction of $470,300 in item 6, air operations, owing to the revised deployment schedule related to helicopter operations in the mission area. Upon inquiry, the Committee was informed that two helicopters are currently deployed in the mission area. They enable the mobile military observer teams to carry out their tasks, which, owing to the poor infrastructure in the country, requires some of the assignments to be carried out by air transportation. These teams report violations of cease-fire and arms embargo at border points as well as the disengagement of forces throughout the country. A third helicopter will be required at the end of April or the beginning of May in connection with the disarmament and demobilization programme. The Advisory Committee trusts this deployment will take place only when conditions warrant it. Moreover, it is envisaged that only one helicopter will be required after completion of the disarmament and demobilization programme.

19. The Advisory Committee also notes that an additional requirement of $413,600 is presented under item 9, other equipment. An additional requirement of $18,200 for generators covers the freight cost for two additional generators to be transferred from Brindisi. In addition, a provision of $40,000 is made for the cost of freight for the transfer of three large-capacity water purification units, along with spare parts, from Brindisi and from the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The Committee was informed, upon inquiry, that such equipment was not available in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), but existed in stock in Brindisi and in UNMIH. The Committee also questioned the reduction in the rolled-over amount for water purification equipment owing to changes in size and quantity, as stated in paragraph 14 of annex IV. In this regard, the Committee was informed of a typographical error, which really meant a reduction in the purchase of 13 units at $40,000 each (not $4,000 each) to 14 units of smaller capacity at $7,000 each.

20. Paragraph 12 of document A/50/650/Add.2 outlines the actions that need to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNOMIL for the period from 1 February to 30 June 1996. Taking into account recent developments as described in paragraph 15 above, the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly appropriate the amount of $10,217,700 gross ($9,667,600 net) for the period from 1 February to 31 May 1996, already authorized and assessed under the terms of General Assembly resolution 50/210. The Committee also recommends to the General Assembly the appropriation of an amount of $1,603,500 gross ($1,468,000 net) for the maintenance of UNOMIL for the period from 1 to 30 June 1996, should the Security Council extend its mandate beyond 31 May 1996.

Proposed budget for the 12-month period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997

21. The proposed budget presented by the Secretary-General in document A/50/650/Add.3, for the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997, is estimated at $27,615,100 gross ($25,852,600 net). It reflects a 21 per cent decrease in gross terms when compared with the resources for the preceding 12-month period, owing to the expected completion of the disarmament and demobilization programme, previously envisaged at the end of July 1996, now scheduled for the

end of August 1996. About 60 per cent of the estimated amount is based on standard cost ratios, while 40 per cent covers mission-specific costs.

22. Full deployment of the 160 authorized military observers is expected at the beginning of this period, thus accounting for the increased requirements under military personnel costs. The budget also provides for 94 international civilian staff (34 Professionals, 27 General Service, and 33 Field Service); 107 local personnel and 19 United Nations Volunteers. This represents a net reduction of 419 upon completion of the disarmament and demobilization programme. Two additional posts (1 P-3 and 1 P-2) are required to strengthen the human rights component of UNOMIL as a result of the expanded mandate.

23. The Advisory Committee requested additional information from the Secretariat regarding the level of coordination between the Centre for Human Rights and the human rights component of UNOMIL. The Committee was informed that, although close contact is maintained between both entities regarding the activities of UNOMIL related to its mandate to investigate and report on violations of human rights, there is no duplication of resources, since there is no provision included under the regular budget of the Centre for activities related to Liberia.

24. Additional information was also requested on the dissemination of information among the general public regarding the human rights activities of UNOMIL. The Committee was informed that bulletins of its activities in this regard are issued on a weekly basis to the Liberian National Transitional Government and the press among others; human rights abuses are reported through press statements and reports of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which are disseminated widely through the media; public information activities include educating the general public as to the Mission's human rights mandate and its close work with local human rights non-governmental organizations. The Committee recommends that the necessary measures be taken to adequately disseminate information on the Mission's human rights activities to the general public.

25. The Committee also requested information on how the impact of the public information programme is assessed in Liberia. In this regard, the Committee was informed that a unit exists within the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, restructured in 1995, with a new programme aimed at informing the public on the implementation of various aspects of the peace process, enhancing public awareness on the nature of the role and mandate of UNOMIL in facilitating the process. Preceding the Abuja Agreement, attention focused on the need for national reconciliation, and thereafter, on the need for strict implementation of the peace agreements, observance of the cease-fire and disengagement of forces. As the disarmament and demobilization programme moves forward, activities will focus on combatants and their local commanders; during the resettlement and reintegration process, on the demobilized combatants, internally displaced persons, returnees and local communities; and during the electoral process, on potential voters and political parties. In spite of limitations and delays, the Secretariat believes the activities of the unit have had a significant role in enhancing public awareness about the peace process and the Mission's role, as reflected in the positive change of attitude by the media and the general public towards UNOMIL and the United Nations in recent months.

26. The Committee believes that its comments regarding the election component, indicated in paragraph 16 above, also apply to this 12-month budget period. The full requirements will have to be presented as revised cost estimates for the period once the timing of the elections has been established. Other areas where savings may be identifiable pertain to the use of helicopters, as indicated in paragraph 18, and staff deployment, since it is to be expected that posts will only be filled when there is greater certainty regarding the implementation of the operational plan, as indicated in paragraph 12 above.

27. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee would like to point out that a full inventory of all equipment supplied or purchased using extrabudgetary resources must be supplied in the future. While this information was included in document A/50/650/Add.1, it appears that those assets for disarmament and demobilization were not reflected in the relevant addenda.

28. With regard to paragraph 10 of section D of annex IV to document A/50/650/Add.3, the Advisory Committee was informed that based on the 8.5 per cent of the cost of the civilian staff component, the amount that should have been included in the budget estimates of UNOMIL for the funding of the support account for peace-keeping operations is $1,151,000.

29. Paragraph 28 of document A/50/650/Add.3 outlines the actions to be taken by the General Assembly at its fiftieth session in connection with the financing of UNOMIL. In view of what is stated in paragraph 15 above, with regard to the "roll-over" of $5,158,900 gross ($5,107,300 net), the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly appropriate the amount of $32,774,000 gross ($30,959,900 net), to be assessed at the rate of $8,712,600 gross ($8,467,100 net) for the month of July 1996, and $2,187,400 gross ($2,044,800 net) monthly thereafter, the assessment being subject, however, to the extension of the mandate of UNOMIL by the Security Council.

Annex

Revision to the cost estimates for the period ending 30 June 1996

(United States dollars)

	Revised cost estimates (A/50/650/Add.2) 1 January-30 June 1996 (1)	Cost included for demobilization 1 April-30 June 1996 (2)	Prorated cost of demobilization 1 May-30 June 1996 (3)	Reductions for roll-over to the period 1 July-31 August 1996 (4)=(2-3)
2. Civilian personnel costs				
(b) International and local staff				
International staff salaries	2 299 000	208 400	138 900	(69 500)
Local staff salaries	1 001 600	646 400	430 900	(215 500)
Consultants	-	-	-	-
Overtime	-	-	-	-
Common staff costs	2 294 400	420 400	280 300	(140 100)
Mission subsistence allowance	1 420 400	131 800	87 900	(43 900)
Other travel costs	82 000	-	-	-
Subtotal	7 097 400	1 407 000	938 000	(469 000)
United Nations Volunteers	1 811 200	1 277 600	851 800	(425 800)
Total, line 2	8 908 600	2 684 600	1 789 800	(894 800)
3. Premises/accommodation				
Rental of premises	271 900	46 800	31 200	(15 600)
Alterations and renovation of premises	137 600	-	-	-
Maintenance supplies	18 000	-	-	-
Maintenance services	18 000	-	-	-

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	Revised cost estimates (A/50/650/Add.2) 1 January-30 June 1996 (1)	Cost included for demobilization 1 April-30 June 1996 (2)	Prorated cost of demobilization 1 May-30 June 1996 (3)	Reductions for roll-over to the period 1 July-31 August 1996 (4)=(2-3)
Utilities	63 000	-	-	-
Construction/prefabricated buildings	80 900	-	-	-
Total, line 3	589 400	46 800	31 200	(15 600)
15. Assistance for disarmament and demobilization				
(a) Rehabilitation/reintegration assistance to demobilized military forces				
Consultants	-	-	-	-
Consultants travel	-	-	-	-
Local staff	-	-	-	-
Training	20 000	20 000	20 000	-
Equipment	26 000	26 000	26 000	-
Miscellaneous services	2 700 000	2 700 000	1 000 000	(1 700 000)
Miscellaneous supplies	3 212 000	3 212 000	2 092 000	(1 120 000)
Subtotal	5 958 000	5 958 000	3 138 000	(2 820 000)
(b) Assistance for demobilized forces				
Rations	1 872 000	1 872 000	875 000	(997 000)
Transportation	540 000	540 000	200 000	(340 000)
Subtotal	2 412 000	2 412 000	1 075 000	(1 337 000)
Total, line 15	8 370 000	8 370 000	4 213 000	(4 157 000)

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	Revised cost estimates (A/50/650/Add.2) 1 January-30 June 1996 (1)	Cost included for demobilization 1 April-30 June 1996 (2)	Prorated cost of demobilization 1 May-30 June 1996 (3)	Reductions for roll-over to the period 1 July-31 August 1996 (4)=(2-3)
18. Support account for peace-keeping operations	603 300	119 600	79 700	(39 900)
19. Staff assessment	902 600	154 700	103 100	(51 600)
Grand total	19 373 900	11 375 700	6 216 800	(5 158 900)

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FINANCING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF RWANDA AND RWANDAN CITIZENS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND OTHER SUCH VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF NEIGHBOURING STATES BETWEEN 1 JANUARY AND 31 DECEMBER 1994

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994 (A/C.5/50/54). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with the Prosecutor and the Registrar of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and with representatives of the Secretary-General.

2. The General Assembly, by its resolution 50/213 of 23 December 1995, decided to appropriate to the Special Account for the International Tribunal for Rwanda an amount of $7,609,900 ($7,090,600 net) for the period from 1 January to 31 March 1996, "without prejudice to the comments and recommendations the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions may make following its review of the full budget for 1996".

3. The Secretary-General estimates the amount of $38,770,900 net for the operation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda in 1996. The Committee notes in table 1 of the annex to the report of the Secretary-General that, of $12,914,900 appropriated in 1995, only $1,645,000 was utilized. Therefore, of

the $38,770,900 being requested for 1996, the amount of $11,269,900 is available from the previous period.

4. The Advisory Committee noted a number of differences between the presentation of the budgets of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In this connection, the Committee emphasizes the need for uniformity and comparability between the presentation of the two budgets.

5. With regard to staffing issues, the Secretary-General proposes 404 posts, reflecting an increase of 241 posts over the authorized level for 1995. Upon inquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that these posts were costed at a 50 per cent occupancy for 1996. The Committee was also informed that for the period from 1 January to 31 March 1996, the vacancy rate was 49.1 per cent for Professional staff and 55.3 per cent for those of the General Service and other category.

6. In connection with the recruitment of staff, the Advisory Committee was informed that the International Tribunal for Rwanda had full authority to appoint and promote local staff. However, while the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was delegated authority to appoint staff in the name of the Secretary-General, up to the D-1 level, no specific delegation of authority has been given to the International Tribunal for Rwanda to appoint international staff. In this case, the role of the International Tribunal for Rwanda consists of preparing job descriptions for reviewing and classifying by the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM) and evaluating candidates and making recommendations to OHRM to make the recruitment. In this connection, the Committee was informed that the incumbents of two General Service posts based in New York deal with personnel matters (A/C.5/50/54, annex, table 3).

7. The Advisory Committee was informed that lack of delegated authority to appoint international staff by the International Tribunal for Rwanda has contributed to a delay in the recruitment of appropriate staff. In this connection, the Committee was informed by the Prosecutor that if staff resources were made available, the investigation function could be completed within 18 months and the office at Kigali could be closed soon thereafter. To ensure that staff come on board as soon as possible, the Committee reiterates its earlier recommendation that consideration should be given to granting the International Tribunal for Rwanda delegation of authority in personnel matters.

8. The Advisory Committee notes from paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Secretary-General's report that the International Tribunal for Rwanda held its inaugural session on 30 June 1995 and its second session in Arusha from 8 to 12 January 1996. The Secretary-General indicates in paragraph 20 that "it is anticipated that the Tribunal will hold 12 trials in 1996".

9. In paragraph 22 of the Secretary-General's report, the amount of $797,300 is requested for salaries and allowances of judges. The Committee notes that this estimate is based on the proposals outlined in the note by the Secretary-General on conditions of service and allowances of the members of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (A/C.5/49/11) and takes into

(A/49/7/Add.12). The General Assembly has yet to take a decision on these reports with respect to the Rwanda Tribunal. In this connection, the Committee recommends that the conditions of service and allowances which would be approved for the judges of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia be extended to the judges of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

10. As indicated in paragraph 23 of the Secretary-General's report, it had been anticipated that all the six judges would take up residence in Arusha in early 1996. However, upon inquiry, the Committee was informed that it is now anticipated that the judges will take up residence on 1 June 1996. The Committee was further informed that since no trials have started, the judges were paid a prorated salary "on an as when actually employed basis". Accordingly, the Committee was also informed that the estimate for salaries and allowances of judges for 1996 can be reduced from $797,300 to $539,100.

11. Provision of $282,200 is made in paragraph 24 of the report for six new posts at the P-2 level for legal assistants and six General Service posts. The Committee notes that while in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia legal assistants are part of the extrabudgetary personnel assigned to the Tribunal, under the Tribunal for Rwanda, they are budgeted as established posts.

12. In paragraph 27 of the report, the amount of $30,000 is estimated for consultants and experts for the judges' chambers. As in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Committee was not satisfied with the explanation given for the need for such expertise by the chamber and recommends that the amount of $30,000 not be approved.

13. Requirements for the Office of the Prosecutor are explained in paragraphs 29 to 50 of the report. The Committee notes that this estimate is affected by the fact that the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia will also act as the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for Rwanda in accordance with article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, as established by the Security Council in resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994.

14. As indicated in paragraph 29 of the report, the structure of the Office of Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for Rwanda mirrors the Office of Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It consists of five sections: Immediate Office of the Prosecutor, Investigations, Prosecution, Legal Services, and Information and Records Management. However, unlike in the case of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, where all activities are carried on in The Hague, in the case of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the activities of the Prosecutor's Office are conducted at The Hague, Kigali and Arusha. It is the view of the Committee that the fact that there is one Prosecutor for both Tribunals should not lead to the establishment of a separate unit at The Hague to service the International Tribunal for Rwanda and vice versa since the Committee believes that the Prosecutor should receive service wherever he is, as the case may be.

15. With regard to the Information Management and Records Section under the Prosecutor's Office, the Committee was informed that 21 posts at The Hague

(1 P-4, 1 P-3, 9 P-2 and 10 General Service) would not be required (A/C.5/50/54, para. 44). The documents processing centre which was to be moved from Washington D.C. to The Hague on a temporary basis is being transferred to Arusha directly (see also para. 26 below).

16. The Advisory Committee notes from paragraph 62 of the Secretary-General's report that the post of Chief of Administration would be at the D-1 level. Upon inquiry, the Committee was informed that after review of this post and the equivalent post at the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and based on its initial evaluation of the duties and responsibilities as shown in the job descriptions, both posts have been classified at the D-1 level.

17. With regard to the Security and Safety Service, the Committee recalls paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1050 (1996) of 8 March 1996 in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 5 April 1996 on what arrangements have been agreed with the Government of Rwanda for the protection of the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda after the withdrawal of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The Committee was informed that the request for resources for security in paragraph 57 of the Secretary-General's report was based on the fact that UNAMIR would no longer be available to provide security to the Tribunal. The Committee was also informed that the proposal that security at those premises would be provided by a locally contracted guard company is no longer applicable. In this regard, the Committee was further informed that ongoing negotiations between the United Nations and the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda should lead to an arrangement under which the United Nations would pay for the guards provided by those Governments.

18. On the rationale for establishing the post of Chief of Procurement at the P-4 level, the Committee was informed that this was necessitated by the fact that a delegation of authority has been granted to a local Contracts Committee to make procurement of up to $70,000 per contract (A/C.5/50/54, para. 65).

19. In paragraph 72 of the Secretary-General's report, a P-2 post is proposed for a Conference and Public Relations Officer. In view of the fact that in paragraph 56 of the document, there is provision for three posts for a Press and Information Unit (1 P-4, 1 P-2 and 1 clerk at the local level), the Committee questioned the need for a separate post of Public Relations Officer. The Committee believes that the functions of a Public Relations Officer should be assigned to the Press and Information Unit, which should be able to carry out those responsibilities.

20. The Committee notes from paragraph 73 of the report that the six interpreters for court sessions and the plenary meetings in 1996 would be provided on a temporary basis by Conference Services, Geneva ($352,000). Upon inquiry, the Committee was informed that when permanent capacity in Geneva is available the International Tribunal for Rwanda would reimburse the cost of air travel (Geneva/Arusha/Geneva), daily subsistence allowance and terminal expenses of the interpreters involved. However, when the permanent capacity in Geneva is being fully utilized, either short-term interpreters may be recruited directly for service at the International Tribunal for Rwanda or permanent interpreters at Geneva would service the meetings of the International Tribunal for Rwanda

and short-term interpreters would be recruited to replace the permanent interpreters at Geneva. The Advisory Committee notes that resources for interpretation in the local language are provided as described in paragraph 41 of the report.

21. An amount of $3 million is requested in paragraph 76 of the report to provide for counsel to any accused unable to provide their own representation. The Advisory Committee notes that this amount is comparable to the amount of $2,802,500 requested for the provision of counsel to suspects and the accused in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (A/C.5/50/41, para. 97). However, the Committee also notes a number of differences between the two International Tribunals on this subject. First, the Committee was informed that while in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia the estimate for the defence counsel is based on $110 per hour per attorney, in the case of the Tribunal for Rwanda it is $95. Secondly, the Committee was also informed that in the case for the International Tribunal for Rwanda provision is based on an attorney, an investigator, a clerk and a secretary, while in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia provision is based on an attorney without separate provision for support services. Thirdly, the Committee notes that while in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia there is provision for co-counsel (ibid.) there is no such provision for the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

22. With regard to the need to provide for counsel, the Advisory Committee recommends that procedures should be established to identify bona fide indigents. The Committee also recommends that procedures should be established for recovery of resources from accused persons who have been provided with defence counsels and are found not to qualify for such support.

23. In connection with the selection of defence counsel, the Committee recommends that vigorous efforts be made by the Registrar to ensure that the defence counsel list includes lawyers of various systems of jurisprudence.

24. The Advisory Committee notes from paragraph 83 of the Secretary-General's report that the amount of $800,000 is requested for detention facilities in Arusha. In this connection, as it has done in its report on the financing of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (A/50/925, para. 32), the Advisory Committee recommends that, should there be detainees for the International Tribunal for Rwanda in Europe, consideration should be given to using the facilities at The Hague for temporary detention of accused individuals prior to departure for Arusha so as to minimize costs.

25. In connection with the provision of $1,594,320 in paragraph 85 of the report for rent of facilities in Kigali, the Committee was informed that the full amount might not be required because alternative arrangements are being pursued with regard to accommodation at the "Belgian Village" at less cost.

26. The Committee was informed that the amount of $91,000 requested in paragraph 86 of the report for rental and security of temporary premises in The Hague will no longer be required as the documents processing centre is being transferred from Washington, D.C., to Arusha directly (see also para. 15 above).

27. With regard to witnesses, the Advisory Committee recalls that in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia provision is made for victim/witness insurance (A/C.5/50/41, para. 119). The Committee notes that in case of the International Tribunal for Rwanda there is no comparable provision. In the opinion of the Committee there is no basis for the different treatment of witnesses.

28. The Committee notes from paragraph 88 of the report that the amount of $1,237,892 requested under communications together with those requested under furniture and equipment and vehicles reflects the transfer of some items of equipment from UNAMIR. The Committee also notes that it is anticipated that further equipment would be transferred from UNAMIR to the International Tribunal for Rwanda at the conclusion of the mission. Upon inquiry, the Committee was provided with a list of items to be transferred from UNAMIR to the International Tribunal for Rwanda. With regard to the treatment of transfer of assets between missions, it is the intention of the Committee to return to this issue in the context of its consideration of the relevant report of the Secretary-General.

29. Provision is made in paragraph 94 of the report for the acquisition of vehicles ($2,354,050). Upon inquiry, the Committee was provided with a list of 81 vehicles, which is shown in annex I to the present report. The Advisory Committee trusts that to the extent possible these vehicles will be provided from existing stocks and that specific information will be provided in the next budget submission. The Advisory Committee intends to make a recommendation in this regard in its next report on the financing of UNAMIR.

30. The Committee notes the information on voluntary contributions and trust funds contained in paragraphs 95 to 99 of the report. In the view of the Committee this information is very limited and does not contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the role of voluntary contributions in the implementation of various activities of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. The Committee reiterates its previous recommendation that "the Secretary-General should develop an improved presentation of voluntary contributions and a description and cost estimates of activities financed from voluntary contributions and other sources" (A/49/664, para. 46). In this connection, the Committee was provided with a list of cash and personnel contributions, which is contained in annex II to the present report.

31. An update was provided to the Advisory Committee on information contained in paragraph 97 of the report. The Committee was informed that, as of March 1996, 26 individuals have been provided to the International Tribunal for Rwanda by a number of Governments in the form of loan personnel (Netherlands 19 persons, Norway 3, Switzerland 1, United Kingdom 1 and United States 2). The Committee was also informed that, as in the case of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, under the International Tribunal for Rwanda loan personnel have not been included in the estimate of the number of posts requested for 1996 (see para. 5 above). In this connection, the Committee trusts that efforts will continue to obtain in broader geographical representation in this category of personnel.

32. The Committee notes from paragraph 100 of the report that costs relating to the protection of victims and witnesses will be covered from voluntary

contributions. The Committee was unable to ascertain the status of expenditures of voluntary funds received by the Tribunal. The Committee recommends that the Secretary-General disclose fully, in the context of the next budget presentation, both the receipt and the application of voluntary funds. The Committee recalls that it had pointed out "that at all times transparency of purpose and use of voluntary funds must be ensured, without compromising the confidentiality of information for the protection of victims and witnesses" (A/49/7/Add.12, para. 27). The Committee reiterates its recommendation that the Secretary-General issue specific guidelines on the requirements for receipt of contributions and application of funds for the Tribunal at the earliest opportunity.

33. Taking into account its comments in paragraphs 10, 12, 15, 19 and 26 above, the Committee recommends that the General Assembly approve $32,552,000 gross ($29,404,100 net) for the maintenance of the International Tribunal for Rwanda for 1996. This is in addition to the amount of $7,609,900 gross ($7,090,600 net) already appropriated for the period from 1 January to 31 March 1996 by the General Assembly in its resolution 50/213.

34. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in paragraph 13 of its resolution 49/251 of 20 July 1995, the General Assembly decided to review the mode of financing of the International Tribunal at its fifty-second session. The Committee believes that, given the need to prepare for the long-term implications of the work of the Tribunal and the requirements that may develop in 1996, the period of the review of the mode of financing should be advanced.

ANNEX I

Supplementary information - vehicle requirements

	Current inventory or ordered a/	Total proposed	Unit cost	Total cost
Sedan, light		6	15 000	90 000
Sedan, medium		6	17 000	102 000
Sedan, heavy		1	20 000	20 000
Sedan, armoured		2	150 000	300 000
Jeep, 4x4	7	51	20 000	880 000
Pick-up, double cabin		6	16 000	96 000
Bus, light		7	15 000	105 000
Truck, cargo, light		2	40 000	80 000
Truck, cargo, medium		3	75 000	225 000
Truck, armoured		1	150 000	150 000
Truck, recovery		1	75 000	75 000
Folk-lift, light		2	30 000	60 000
Subtotal		88		2 183 000
Less: UNAMIR contribution b/				136 000
Total (acquisition of vehicles)				2 047 000
Freight, 15 per cent				307 050
Spare parts, repair and maintenance				200 836
Workshop equipment				20 000
Petrol, oils and lubricants				106 900
Vehicle insurance				17 400
Grand total				2 699 186

a/ Includes contributions-in-kind to the strategy team.

b/ An amount of $136,000 has been reduced in the light of the transfer of vehicles from UNAMIR (one sedan, medium; one pick-up, double cabin; two motorcycles and five 4x4 Jeeps).

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ANNEX II

Voluntary fund to support the activities of the International Tribunal for Rwanda

A. Cash contributions

Date	Contributor	Contribution received (United States dollars)
10 January 1995	Switzerland	75 757.58
11 January 1995	New Zealand	31 860.00
9 March 1995	Ireland	79 225.00
14 March 1995	Egypt	1 000.00
29 March 1995	Chile	1 000.00
4 April 1995	Lebanon	3 000.00
11 April 1995	Greece	20 000.00
19 May 1995	Israel	7 500.00
23 May 1995	Holy See	3 000.00
23 June 1995	Belgium	1 115 949.43
10 July 1995	Norway	49 983.00
13 July 1995	Sweden	68 728.52
29 July 1995	New Zealand	2 932.00
14 August 1995	Spain	78 751.00
29 August 1995	Denmark	43 451.81
19 September 1995	Netherlands	2 995 530.86
24 October 1995	Spain	71 249.00
27 November 1995	Canada	367 450.00
29 December 1995	Ireland	158 478.60
TOTAL		5 174 846.80

B. Personnel (as of March 1996)

Contributor	Function	Number of personnel
Netherlands	Investigators	19
Norway	Investigators	3
Switzerland	External Relations Officer	1
United Kingdom	Investigator	1
United States	Investigator	1
United States	Administrative	1
TOTAL		26

C. Equipment

Contributor	Description	Number
For investigation teams		
Norway	Nissan Patrol	2
Netherlands	Dell laptop computer	20
Netherlands	Automobile adaptor	20
Netherlands	Portable modem	20
Netherlands	Microsoft office software	20
Netherlands	Canon BJ-30 printers	10
Netherlands	Vehicle	10 a/
European Union	Backhoe excavator	1
European Union	4x4 vehicles and radios	7
European Union	Trailers	3
European Union	Track - General purpose (Hiab)	1
European Union	Tranker trailer (Water)	1
European Union	Generator	2
European Union	Sanitation unit	1
European Union	Office equipment	1
European Union	Size surveying equipment	1
European Union	Portable X-ray	1
European Union	Portable PC (+ 4 batteries)	8
European Union	Portable printer and charger	1
European Union	Various field forensic equipment (250 autopsies)	1
European Union	Lab services (Lot)	1
European Union	Camera	3
European Union	Processing (Lot)	1
European Union	Forensic reference books (Lot)	1
European Union	Tentbed sites	1
For library		
European Union	Books (Lot)	1
European Union	Shelves and furniture (Lot)	1
European Union	PCs	4
European Union	Public terminal	1
European Union	Printer	1
European Union	CD ROM	4
European Union	Modem	1
European Union	Telefax	1
European Union	Software	4
European Union	Photocopier	1
European Union	Scanner	1
European Union	Microfiche reader	1
European Union	UPS	5

Contributor	Description	Number
For library (continued)		
European Union	Air-conditioner/humidifier	2
European Union	Fire extinguisher	4
European Union	Video conferencing equipment and technical in-country support for 6 to 9 months	1

a/ To be provided shortly.